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The purpose of the current study was to examine the relationship between child 
care program quality and the socioeconomic contexts of the communities in which they 
operate. The sample, which included nearly all licensed child care providers in North 
Carolina in 2008, resulted in 6882 programs nested within 619 zip codes and 78 
counties. The cross-sectional design integrated data from multiple sources. Child care 
program characteristics, including rated program quality, were acquired from the North 
Carolina Division of Child Development. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau was used to 
measure socioeconomic characteristics of communities at the zip code level. Data from 
the North Carolina State Head Start Collaboration Office, North Carolina Office of School 
Readiness, and the North Carolina Division of Child Development were incorporated to 
examine program funding and subsidy levels from various sources. Data from the North 
Carolina Partnership for Children were used to identify quality enhancement funds at the 
county level. Multi-level modeling was utilized to examine the nested data structure of 
child care programs within communities. Child care quality varied across communities 
and program quality was modestly correlated when programs were in closer proximity. 
Program level characteristics, as well as community level socioeconomics were both 
related to differential quality among child care programs, suggesting that access to high 
quality child care varies across community contexts.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Access to high quality child care for children and families living in and near poverty is 
a social priority in closing the achievement gap and preventing intergenerational poverty. 
Helburn and Bergmann (2002) contend, “there is a public interest in good quality child 
care” (p. 161). This is especially relevant for children living in poverty. Not only are 
families navigating the social and economic disparities associated with poverty, they 
must often navigate a multi-tiered child care system with market constraints and 
undependable quality. Consequently, evaluating the impact of current child care policies, 
challenging the status quo, and exposing possible vulnerabilities in the child care system 
is essential to altering the course of millions of young lives involved in licensed child 
care. 
The purpose of the current study was to examine how socioeconomics of community 
contexts shape access to high quality child care in North Carolina. North Carolina 
implemented a child care Quality Rating and Improvement System (QRIS) in 1999, 
rating the quality of licensed child care programs from 1 to 5 stars. Since the inception of 
the rated license, child care quality in North Carolina has improved. Specifically, the 
number of child care programs earning 4 and 5 stars increased by 13% for centers and 
by 16% for family child care homes (North Carolina Rated License Assessment Project, 
2005). Despite this increase, in 2005, the large majority of licensed programs (66% of 
child care centers and 67% of family child care homes) in North Carolina had 3 or fewer
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stars. With variation in socioeconomics across communities, the impact of the rated 
license across contexts and access to the highest quality programs is unknown. The 
purpose of the current study was to fill this gap through an examination of the 
relationship between child care program quality and the socioeconomic contexts of the 
communities in which they operate. 
The study included five aims that: (a) examined the variation in child care quality 
across communities of various size (zip codes and counties), (b) examined the 
relationship between state and federal funding and child care quality, (c) examined the 
relationship between child care quality and the socioeconomic context of communities, 
(d) examined the extent to which county level Smart Start funding influences the 
relationship between the socioeconomic context of communities and child care quality, 
and (e) examined the socioeconomic contexts of child care programs participating and 
not participating in the voluntary assessment process.   
The study evaluated access to high quality child care across North Carolina 
communities by utilizing an innovative research design and methodology. Multiple data 
sources were used in hierarchical linear models with two and three levels to inform 
future state and national policies that promote equitable access to high quality child care 
across community contexts.  
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
The current study was grounded in Urie Bronfenbrenner’s bioecological 
perspective; a framework developed to understand behavioral changes over time and 
how development is influenced within context. At the heart of the bioecological theory is 
discovery and verification (Bronfenbrenner, 2005a; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006). 
These modes of inquiry promote understanding of behavior within and between contexts 
and inspire scientific-based policies and programs for human well-being. Subsequently, 
the theory is a natural compass for the study of child care policy. In fact, Bronfenbrenner 
states, “the course of child care policy and practice is shaped in substantial degree by its 
broader context in time and place” (Bronfenbrenner, 2005b, p. 281). The bioecological 
perspective includes several propositions (Bronfenbrenner, 2005). The current study 
focused on the proposition describing the Process-Person-Context-Time (PPCT) model.  
 By combining the idea of proximal processes with a person’s genetic and social 
history across time and space, the PPCT model describes developmental outcomes as a 
joint function of the developing person, process, context, and time (Bronfenbrenner & 
Evans, 2000). The PPCT model is a nested structure to explain and understand the 
production of developmental outcomes. That is, “a developmental outcome at a later 
point in time [D2] is a joint function of the process; characteristics of the developing 
person; the nature of the immediate, ‘face-to-face’ environmental context in which the 
person lives; and the length of the frequency of the time interval [T2-T1] during which the 
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developing person has been exposed to the particular process and the environmental 
setting under consideration” (Bronfenbrenner & Evans, p. 116).  
In reference to early childhood programs, children are the developing agents of 
focus; they represent the person in this model. They come to early childhood programs 
from genetic histories as well as cultures, families and beliefs about the world which they 
hold as their own. They enter a shared space with teachers and peers who also bring 
with them their genetic histories, cultures, families, and beliefs and engage in shared 
experiences within the classroom across time. Such experiences, learning opportunities, 
are the very purpose of early childhood programs. Based on their own level of agency, 
children engage in interactions with peers, teachers, and their surrounding environment 
including materials that lead to processes (P) which inform their development. These 
processes however, are also situated within micro and macro-level contexts or the 
boundaries of programmatic supports and barriers as well as within a larger 
socioeconomic and political community.  
The current study specifically honed in on the relationship among contexts in 
which children develop. Theoretically, context (C) is broken down into several inter-
related systems including the microsystem, mesosystem, exosystem, and macrosystem.  
Individuals’ immediate environments are considered microsystems, the interaction 
between various microsystems such as home and child care is an example of the 
mesosystem while influences of environments that indirectly affect the developing 
person describe the exosystem. All of the systems are embedded within larger societal 
ideologies and culture embodied by the macrosystem (Bronfenbrenner, 1988).  
The current study examined the quality of child care nested within the 
socioeconomic contexts of communities (at the zip code level) that function within county 
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level funding contexts and under the umbrella of state child care policy. For example, 
state Quality Rating and Improvement Systems create standards that inform the 
profession and public about what is required for different levels of quality care and 
education. These standards subsequently become a part of a dominant understanding of 
differential quality in early childhood programs which informs the market and may be 
connected to incentives such as tiered reimbursement rates for subsidy and quality 
enhancement initiatives. The way in which this policy plays out within communities of 
varying socioeconomic conditions is unknown.  
With standards defined by state Quality Rating and Improvement Systems, 
identifying differential levels of quality among child care programs, it is especially 
important to ensure equal access to high quality programs across communities of all 
socioeconomic strata. For example, community contexts predominately representing 
populations of low socioeconomic status are likely composed of homes (microsystems) 
with fewer resources compared to community contexts collectively of higher 
socioeconomic status. The child care programs within these communities also represent 
microsystems that families navigate and often which they rely on. Subsequently, the 
current study examined the relationship between child care quality and the 
socioeconomic context of communities in which they reside impacted by macro-level 
policies and county level funding across the state of North Carolina.  
Because the macrosystem incorporates social, economic, political, and cultural 
dynamics, the chronosystem marking historical events and generational residuals 
influence and are influenced by the macrosystem. The chronosystem, defined by time 
(T), is integrated within each of the other systems, experienced as small moments 
(microtime), repeated experiences (mesotime) or historical events and changes 
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(macrotime) (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006). For example, among many cities in North 
Carolina, segregation in housing and schools lingers despite changes in the law. That is, 
the socioeconomic conditions among North Carolina communities are likely to be 
influenced by the historical dynamics of the state including a history of slavery and white 
supremacy. Furthermore, it is important to understand the multidirectional and dynamic 
nature of context involving all five systems (micro, meso, exo, macro, and chrono). 
However, the current study tests the nature in which current child care policy in the state 
(macrosystem) informs child care quality (microsystems) nested within community 
contexts of varying socioeconomic conditions and county funding. Although beyond the 
purview of the current study, characteristics of the exosystem in this model may be 
inferred with community socioeconomics and county funding indirectly affecting 
children’s learning experiences through the quality of child care.    
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CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
The current review of literature first examines the national socioeconomic context 
of young children and their families. Secondly, evidence from intervention and program-
based models is presented as support for investing in young children. Third, child care 
quality in relation to children’s developmental outcomes, especially among children living 
in and near poverty is described. This section further offers evidence that indicates 
unequal access to high quality programs based on race and class. Fourth, child care 
market constraints are explained followed by issues of affordability and subsidy. Finally, 
current policy decisions and quality enhancement efforts are presented as well as 
information about the North Carolina context where the current study takes place. 
Socioeconomic Context of Communities 
Based on Bronfenbrenner’s PPCT model, child care programs are situated within 
community contexts (Bronfenbrenner, 2005b). Variation in community contexts is 
attributed to socioeconomic structures (Hartsock, 1986). To ensure social justice for our 
youngest citizens, an examination of the socioeconomic context of communities and 
child care quality is needed. In the current study community context is described by the 
socioeconomic conditions within a designated area such as zip codes and counties. 
Furthermore, socioeconomics is defined as “of, relating to or involving a combination of 
social and economic factors” (Marriam-Webster, 2008). Additionally, the National Center 
of Education Statistics (2008) defines socioeconomic status as a measure of “relative 
economic and social ranking.” 
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Both social and economic factors are important characteristics of 
socioeconomics and are included by the United States Census Bureau (2007). 
Economic factors are an important part of community context because they represent 
the monetary wealth of a community (e.g. average income, home ownership). Social 
factors are an important part of community context because they represent the social 
power of a community in relationship to the dominant culture (e.g. race/ethnicity, 
education level). The social and economic factors of socioeconomics form complex 
intersections. Examining the socioeconomic context of communities in relationship to 
child care quality may inform policies that may protect against inequities in early learning 
experiences faced by our most vulnerable children, children in poverty. Furthermore, in a 
review of social programs as part of the Urban Institute’s Assessing the New Federalism 
project, Adams, Tout and Zaslow (2007) calls for additional research to “disentangle” (p. 
10) reasons for differential child care quality experienced by children of different 
socioeconomic backgrounds. The current study provides information about the child care 
programs operating within communities of varying socioeconomics and incorporates the 
state and federal funding allocated to programs to accommodate children in need. 
National Context 
Twenty-two percent or 5.5 million children under six in the United States are a 
part of families that are poor, below the federal poverty line (Wight & Chau, 2009). The 
federal poverty line is based on a formula that was initially calculated in 1963 to assess 
risk factors of low income families; today, the federal poverty line for a family of four is 
$22,050 (National Center for Children in Poverty, 2010). According to the National 
Center for Children in Poverty, it is estimated that families require twice the amount 
assigned by the federal limits to meet their basic needs. Subsequently, families earning 
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between the federal poverty line and 200% of the limit are experiencing economic 
disparity. With this in mind, 44% or 11.1 million children younger than six years old live 
with families that are considered low-income, below the 200% poverty threshold. Since 
2000, this number increased by 17%, suggesting a growing pattern of economic 
disparity among America’s youngest citizens and their families.  
When considering the number of young children living in poor and low income 
families, it is even more alarming to learn that the majority (74%) have at least one 
parent working full or part time (Wight & Chau, 2009). Specifically, 8% of young children 
that are poor (below the poverty line) have a parent employed full time and another 44% 
have a parent employed part time or part year. Expanding these statistics to include low-
income families (200% the poverty line), 29% of low-income children have a parent 
employed full time and another 74% have a parent employed part time or part year. One 
reason for the high rates of employment among the poor and low-income population is 
likely a result of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) of 1996, requiring recipients of government assistance (Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families; TANF) to work with strict time limits for assistance.  
Moving parents with young children into the labor force requires them to find 
alternative care – often from a variety of arrangements – for their children including both 
regulated and unregulated options (Scott, London, & Hurst, 2005). Regulations vary by 
state but tend to include provisions for basic health and safety (Adams, Tout, & Zaslow, 
2007). The types of care low-income children attend include center-based care (24%) 
family child care (6%), relative care (25%), and babysitters (3%) with 37% cared for in 
two or more settings. Quality among these programs is variable and the types of care 
families access is based on several factors. Adams, Tout, and Zaslow outline factors 
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that affect children’s child care arrangements including parent comfort levels with 
differing child care arrangements, personal circumstances (financial, access to 
friends/family, employment status/schedule, location/transportation), availability and 
accessibility of neighborhood programs, quality of options, cost of options, and 
awareness of options. “To add to the complexity,” according to Adams, Tout, and 
Zaslow, “all these factors can interact dynamically” (p. 12) and are situated in a market-
based system, with the exception of limited program-based models like Head Start and 
public Pre-K, which do not tend to align with parental work schedules and typically 
require additional care arrangements. Therefore, parents are left to navigate a child care 
market that “does not produce uniformly good care” (Helburn & Bergmann, 2002). As a 
result of competing policies, there is market failure among the child care industry, 
restricting choices that families have for the care and education of their children (Gordon 
& Chase-Lansdale, 2001). According to Loeb, Fuller, Kagan, & Carol (2004), “under 
strong and immediate pressure to work outside the home, low-income mothers may be 
constrained in their choices, depending on the stock of care options available locally” 
(p.48).  
Because there are a disproportionate number of young children of color living in 
or near poverty, when examining the complexities of poverty, the intersection of race and 
class must be a part of the discussion. Currently, 64% of Black, 64% of Hispanic, 30% of 
White, 28% of Asian, and 69% of American Indian children birth through five years old 
live in low-income households (White & Chau, 2009). Additionally, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 requires 
families receiving government assistance to work, expanding the demand for child care 
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among poor families and disproportionately affecting Black, Latino, and American Indian 
children.  
Program-Based and Intervention Models 
Over time we have learned from successful intervention and program-based 
models that investing in young children, especially those most at risk, better prepares 
them for school and reaps long term social and economic benefits for society (Heckman, 
2010; Cunha & Heckman, 2006). Furthermore, the academic and social benefits gained 
from intentional intervention models supports national expansion focused on improving 
the learning environments of young children, especially those with multiple risk factors 
(Waldfogel, 2002; Duncan, Ludwig, & Magnuson, 2007). In fact, in an extensive review 
of public policies, the greatest social and economic outcomes are yielded when 
investments are made during the early years compared to later in life (Heckman; Cunha 
& Heckman). Such investments are based on invention studies that include the 
Abecedarian Project (Campbell & Ramey, 1994; Campbell, Ramey, Pungello, Sparling, 
& Miller-Johnson, 2002; Ramey & Ramey, 2004), the Infant Health and Development 
Project (McCormick et al., 2006; Lee, 2005), the Perry Preschool Project (Yoshikawa, 
1995; Schweinhart & Weikart, 1997), and the Chicago Child Parent Centers (Clements, 
Reynolds, & Hickey, 2004). Studies of program-based models, funded by state and 
federal government for the purpose of increasing the supply of high quality child care, 
include Early Head Start and Head Start (Love, Kisker, et al., 2005; U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2010; Abbott-Shim, Lamber, & McCarty, 2003) and public 
pre-Kindergarten (National Institute for Early Education Research, 2010; LoCasale-
Crouch, et al., 2007) which also suggest promising results for young children in need 
(Adams, Tout, & Zaslow, 2007). 
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More specifically, in the Abecedarian Project significant differences between 
experimental and control groups were detected in IQ as early as 18 months with young 
children in the child care intervention model scoring significantly better (Campbell & 
Ramey, 1994). Overall, at age 4 the child care intervention had a large effect on IQ (.73 
to 1.45; Ramey & Ramey, 2004). These effects endured through the initial test period of 
8 years and continued into adolescence. In a follow up study when the children were 21 
years old, treatment effects were slightly larger for children receiving both the early 
intervention and the school-age intervention; however, the child care intervention reaped 
the most benefit (Campbell, Ramey, Pungello, Sparling, & Miller-Johnson, 2002). In 
addition to academic related outcomes, children in the child care intervention completed 
more years of school, were less likely to repeat a grade, were less likely to be placed in 
special education, were more likely to work in a skilled job, and were less likely to have a 
child during the teen years (Ramey & Ramey; Campbell, Ramey, Pungello, Sparling, & 
Miller-Johnson). The Abecedarian Project was replicated in a randomized clinical trial 
with low birth weight, premature infants in the Infant Health and Development Program 
(McCormick et al., 2006; Lee, 2005). Results indicated that children experiencing the 
intervention benefited from higher cognitive scores and fewer behavior problems with 
similar longitudinal impact of the Abecedarian Project at age 18 (McCormick et al., 
2006).   
Children that participated in the Perry Preschool Project (Yoshikawa, 1995) 
reaped long term social and economic benefits. Based on the longitudinal social and 
economic impact study of the project, it was estimated that for every $1.00 spent on the 
project, $7.00 was returned to society (Schweinhart & Weikart, 1997). The children of 
this project obtained more schooling and engaged in fewer problems with the law. 
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Similarly, in the Chicago Child Parent Centers preschool participants faired best in 
kindergarten word analysis, eighth grade reading, were less likely to experience juvenile 
delinquency, and more likely to complete high school (Clements, Reynolds, & Hickey, 
2004).  
In a study of Early Head Start young children had better cognitive and socio-
emotional development at age 3 compared to children not participating in Early Head 
Start, with the children attending programs adhering most closely to the federal program 
performance standards exhibiting the best outcomes (Love, Kisker, et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, the National Head Start Impact Study revealed positive gains in cognitive, 
social, emotional, and health related outcomes for children in Head Start (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2010).  Additionally, in a study of Head Start 
with random assignment, children in the program group exhibited significantly faster 
growth rate in receptive vocabulary and phonemic awareness compared to the 
comparison group (children on the waiting list; Abbott-Shim, Lamber, & McCarty, 2003). 
Children scoring lowest at the initial test and included in the Head Start program 
exhibited the greatest gain, suggesting the most impact of the intervention for those 
most at risk. 
 In response to the achievement gap, many states are implementing public pre-K 
programs (National Institute for Early Education Research, 2010). Based on several 
reviews of pre-K programs across the nation, many pre-K programs are reporting 
improved outcomes for children at risk (e.g. Hustedt, Barnett, Jung, & Goetze, 2009; 
Gormley, Phillips, & Gayer, 2008, Peisner-Feinberg & Schaaf, 2008). However, some 
inequities among pre-K programs still seem to exist. In a recent study of 692 pre-school 
classrooms across 11 states children in poverty and children of color were more likely to 
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be in lower quality public pre-K classrooms compared to their more affluent peers 
(LoCasale-Crouch, et al., 2007). More specifically, cluster analysis revealed that the 
highest quality classrooms “contained more Caucasian teachers than expected, 
teachers with more pre-kindergarten experience, and a lower student/teacher ratio” (p. 
10). Additionally, these classrooms were least likely to have children of color or children 
in poverty attending them.  In contrast, the lowest quality classrooms “contained fewer 
Caucasian and more African American teachers...a lower student/adult ratio..longer 
program days…and were more likely to receive Head Start funding” (p. 12). Additionally, 
these classrooms had the highest proportion of children of color and children in poverty. 
This study is alarming considering that one of the goals of public pre-K is to better 
prepare at risk children for kindergarten. For example, the pre-K program in North 
Carolina, More-at-Four, is targeted to four year olds at risk in order to better prepare 
them for school. The program is implemented in public schools, Head Start programs, 
and in community-based child care programs (North Carolina Office of School 
Readiness, 2010b). Children attending More-at-Four have demonstrated improved 
outcomes in the areas of language/literacy, math, general knowledge, and behavioral 
skills (Peisner-Feinberg & Schaaf, 2008).  
Based on intensive intervention programs, it is estimated that for every $1.00 
spent on improving early childhood education environments for young children in 
poverty, $8.00 to $14.00 is saved as a result of later academic, social, and economic 
productivity (Duncan, Ludwig, & Magnuson, 2007).  Due to the multiple risk factors 
facing children from poor and low-income families, the positive effects associated with 
high quality learning environments in child care seem to be especially important (Evans, 
2004). Participating in formal child care may be one way to improve school readiness 
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among children living in and near poverty, a goal of intervention and program-based 
models. Furthermore, child care quality has important implications for children living in 
and near poverty with programs adhering to high standards similar to intervention 
models resulting in the best outcomes for children (Rigby, Ryan, and Brooks-Gunn, 
2007).  
Community-Based Child Care 
Research suggests that participation in formal child care may enhance cognitive 
development among children living in poverty through the learning environment 
(Caughy, Daughtry, DiPietro, & Stobino, 1994; Connell & Prinz, 2002; Magnuson, 
Meyers, Ruhm, & Waldfogel, 2004; Winsler et al., 2008). For example, in the Three-City 
Study there was a positive relationship between hours in formal child care and math 
skills among children 2-4 years old (Votruba-Drzal, Coley, Chase-Landsdale, 2004). 
That is, the number of hours in child care was modestly related to children’s quantitative 
skills. Additionally, the child care programs that were of higher quality were related to 
better social development with fewer instances of internalizing and externalizing 
behaviors. Reading skills were boosted for children in higher quality care and who also 
had more stimulating home environments. Children coming from homes with little 
stimulation and who were in low quality care exhibited the highest rates of externalizing 
behaviors. These findings emphasize the increased additive risk of low quality home and 
low quality child care environments. Considering that the average global quality score 
across the sample was “minimal”, based on ECERS-R and FDCRS scores, the potential 
opportunity for superior child care environments to positively influence the lives of low-
income children is promising. That is, children living in and near poverty who may not 
have stimulating home environments may have experiences in child care that support 
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academic readiness and social development. In fact, high quality child care may even 
buffer some negative effects associated with poverty on children’s development (Brooks-
Gunn, Klebanov, & Liaw, 1995). Utilizing nationally representative data from the Early 
Childhood Longitudinal Study, Magnuson, Meyers, Ruhm, and Waldfogel (2004) also 
found children attending center-based child care the year prior to kindergarten scored 
higher in math and reading through first grade. The effects were greatest for children 
from impoverished backgrounds. Winsler and colleagues (2008) found center care 
attendance - accessed through the use of subsidy - to improve academic and social 
outcomes for low-income children.  More specifically, children accessing center care 
made gains in cognitive and social development.  
Children experiencing higher quality child care are cognitively and socially more 
advanced (Helburn, 1995; Burchinal, Peisner-Feinberg, Bryant, & Clifford, 2000; NICHD, 
2002). Conversely, children in lower quality programs, which are sometimes unsafe, 
experience care resulting in compromised outcomes. The NICHD Early Child Care 
Research Network reported better cognitive and language ability among children in 
higher quality child care. These positive effects prevailed into elementary school with 
respect to language and cognitive development, math ability, and behavioral and social 
development (Peisner-Feinberg, Burchinal, Clifford, Culkin, Howes, Kagan, & Yazejian, 
2001). The strongest effects associated with high quality child care were among children 
at risk (i.e. low maternal education) yet, the more advantaged children were in the 
highest quality care.  
Despite the research that concludes child care quality is related to children’s 
outcomes (Burchinal, Peisner-Feinberg, Bryant, & Clifford, 2000; Helburn, 1995; NICHD, 
2002), there is evidence that children in and near poverty are more likely to be in 
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programs that are of lower quality compared to children from families with higher 
incomes. For example, Phillips, Voran, Kisker, Howes, & Whitebook (1994) found that 
children from upper class families experienced the highest quality child care compared 
to low and middle class children. Based on ITERS and ECERS scores, children with low 
and middle incomes were in classrooms below the “good” level of quality unlike their 
higher income peers. Although a curvilinear relationship among income and global 
quality was depicted (based on ITERS and ECERS scores), this study reported that 
children of lower class were most likely to be in programs that had insensitive and 
detached emotional environments (based on the Arnett Scale). 
Additionally, in a study of child care use in Georgia, African American children 
were less likely to be in “good” quality care compared to European American children 
(Howes, Sakai, Shinn, Phillips, Galinsky, & Whitebook, 1995). One plausible explanation 
for this finding is cultural bias in measurement. However, with the intersection of race 
and class, other inequities are likely at play. Furthermore, path analyses indicated 
differential patterns of child care quality used by African American and European 
American families based on social class. That is, work demands mediated the 
relationship between social class and child care quality among African American 
families, whereas, work demands did not mediate this relationship for European 
American families. Differentiation by race and class in the quality of child care utilized 
points to the complex social dynamics involved in creating equitable access to high 
quality child care.  
In a study of family child care homes and relative care in California, Texas, and 
North Carolina, family income was related to the quality of adult-child interactions and 
the quality of the learning environment in child care settings (Kontos, 1997). In this study 
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75% of very low-income, 43% of low-income, and 13% of moderate-income children 
were in care that was of inadequate quality. Furthermore, the sample of very low-income 
children primarily included African American and Latino children, again highlighting the 
intersection of race and class and how that impacts our youngest citizens’ experiences 
in child care.  
Public education is scrutinized for inequitable access to high quality public 
schools based on race and class (Ladson-Billings, 1995). There is evidence that the 
child care sector is following in the same path (Howes, Sakai, Shinn, Phillips, Galinsky, 
& Whitebook, 1995; Kontos, 1997) and perpetuated by current policies (Cassidy, Lower, 
Kintner, and Hestenes, 2009). Cassidy and colleagues found compromised structural 
supports that resulted in lower processual quality in child care classrooms with African 
American teachers. These classrooms also had a greater percentage of African 
American children compared to classrooms with European American teachers. 
Specifically, classrooms with African American teachers included fewer teachers in the 
classroom and those teachers had less education compared to the classrooms with 
European American teachers. In addition, the classrooms with African American 
teachers had 24% more children receiving subsidy and thus were likely to be from low-
income families and requiring extra support, despite the inequitable structural resources 
available to the classrooms.  
Market Constraints in a Multi-Tiered System 
It is evident that the current child care system is a multi-tiered system, a system 
of child care that represents a wide-range of quality and is disproportionally accessible to 
families. Based on results from the Cost Quality and Child Outcomes study and the 
Family Child Care Home Study (Helburn & Howes, 1996), cost of child care and process 
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quality is correlated. Further, relying on parent perceptions of quality to drive the child 
care system is problematic. That is, research indicates that parents and early childhood 
professionals rate child care quality differently. Helburn and Howes contend that 
“parents are not well-informed consumers and do not adequately judge child care 
quality” (p. 70). Cryer and Burchinal (1997) reported that parents falsely inflate scores 
during natural observations of their child care program when rating characteristics that 
they valued in a child care setting. In contrast, when parents were provided with a full 
range of quality options through the use of hypothetical vignettes, Shlay, Tran, 
Weinraub, & Harmon (2005) found low-income African American parents to prefer 
characteristics of higher quality settings (i.e. care-giving environment, teacher behavior, 
accreditation, etc.) and attributed more financial value to these characteristics compared 
to characteristics of lower quality settings. This finding suggests if the supply of higher 
quality choices were accessible and affordable to families, they are likely to be chosen 
over lower quality options. However, when the supply of high quality care is dependent 
on parent fees, higher quality options become simply not affordable and therefore the 
demand trumps what supply offers in terms of quality.   
In order to improve access to high quality child care direct methods to improve 
supply are necessary beyond consumer education (Kisker & Ross, 1997). That is, 
currently there are market constraints (Shlay, Tran, Weinraub, & Harmon, 2005) that 
prevent parents from securing their ideal child care choice. For example, Li-Grining and 
Coley (2006) examined child care experiences of low-income families in Boston, 
Chicago, and San Antonio. The sample included 238 children in a variety of care 
settings including Head Start (14%), center care (29%), licensed family child care (6%), 
relative care in home (25%), relative care out of home (19%), and non-relative care out 
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of home (7%). Of the programs, Head Start was financially the best option and the only 
program that offered “good” quality care. Among families not receiving a subsidy (50% of 
the sample), cost of care was not significantly different across types of care utilized. On 
average parents reported spending $40.57 per week or 24% of their income. 
Approximately 66% of mothers that indicated they preferred center care reported 
actually using center care. Although differences in cost were not found across types of 
care, discrepancies between preferred child care and actual child care arrangements 
suggest other supply constraints may also be in play.   
From an economic perspective, demand for child care (e.g. as a result of 
PRWORA) may result in more availability but, such demand does not ensure access to 
high quality choices. At the federal level, the Child Care Development Block Grant now 
authorized as Child Care and Development Fund administered by the Child Care Bureau 
allocates funds to be used for child care subsidies to “enable low-income [working] 
families to access quality child care, which in turn makes it possible for parents to leave 
welfare and to achieve self-sufficiency” (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Administration for Children and Families, 2008). This strategy is based on the idea that 
child care vouchers increase the purchasing power of low-income families, resulting in 
higher quality child care in low-income communities (Fuller, Kagan, Caspary, & Gauthier, 
2002). While there is evidence that these subsidies do indeed alleviate some of the 
financial burden associated with child care costs (Kisker & Ross, 1997), improve the 
odds that children will be in regulated care (Huston, 2004), and are desperately needed 
by low wage workers (as testified by long waiting lists; Polakow, 2007); research 
presents a more complicated picture of patterns of supply and use of child care options.  
There is mixed evidence regarding the nature of child care supply among 
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communities of various socioeconomic strata. Some research suggests a curvilinear 
relationship to child care supply, with the most supply in poor and affluent locations 
compared to middle-income neighborhoods. For example, based on the national 1990 
census data, the proportion of preschool teachers per 1,000 children was highest in poor 
and affluent zip codes (Fuller & Strath, 2001). In contrast, Queralt and Witte (1998) 
found supply of part day and full day child care centers to be significantly lower in poor 
neighborhoods in Massachusetts compared to their higher income counterparts. There is 
evidence that child care supply may be influenced by the selection patterns of parents 
based on ethnicity and language. For example, Hirshberg, Huang, and Fuller (2005) 
found ethnicity and language to be related to child care type, indicating that some 
families may prefer extended kin over more formal child care options. However, this 
cannot be fully assumed without sufficient evidence that there is adequate supply. That 
is, “parents have difficulty making informed and appropriate child care choices when the 
supply of good care is restricted” (Howes, Sakai, Shinn, Phillips, Galinsky, & Whitebook, 
1995, p. 119). In fact, a study of five cities across three states found the quality of child 
care used by low-income families was best predicted by the city compared to other 
maternal variables (e.g. race, education, PPVT score, age, hours spent reading to child, 
hours and time of day worked), suggesting that selection factors may be influenced and 
limited by structural barriers in communities (Fuller, Kagan, Loeb, & Chang, 2004). 
Additionally, there is evidence based on national census data that center care is the 
least likely to be accessible in nonmetropolitan poor communities (Gordon & Chase-
Lansdale, 2001). Although the availability of child care is important to working families, 
the quality of child care arrangements utilized by low-income families provides greatest 
understanding into children’s experiences.  
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Affordability, Subsidy and Quality 
 While there is evidence that high quality child care may benefit children of low 
socio-economic status, there are often financial barriers to accessing such programs as 
a result of a child care system influenced by supply and demand as well as affordability. 
A report from the National Women’s Law Center (2008) indicated that families in poverty 
spend a greater percentage of their yearly income on child care compared to their more 
advantaged counterparts. For example, on average families in poverty spend 29% of 
their income on child care in comparison to 14% among families between 100-200% of 
the poverty threshold, and 6% among families with an income above the 200% 
threshold. The report also indicated that the “federal funding for child care assistance 
has been virtually flat-funded for seven years” and that “only one in seven children 
eligible under federal law receives child care assistance” (p. 1).  Low-income families 
who do not receive financial support in the form of subsidy face adversity in paying for 
child care. There is evidence that these children are often in the care of relatives, 
neighbors, fictive kin, or other unregulated arrangements (Li-Grining & Coley, 2006).   
One reason for the complexity of improving child care quality across community 
contexts may be the uncoordinated goals among current initiatives and funding. For 
example, as previously discussed, child care subsidy funds are intended to defray child 
care costs for families in poverty. Although this policy creates more purchasing power 
among families in poverty, subsidies may be used in regulated and unregulated care 
arrangements with variable quality. For example, among low-income African American 
families, the receipt of subsidy was associated with more center-based care and families 
without child care subsidies relied more on informal care by utilizing assistance from 
extended kin (Weinraub, Shlay, Harmon, & Tran, 2005). Although the type of child care 
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used was related to subsidy, on average both the formal and informal care 
arrangements were below “good” quality and were not significantly different from one 
another. As a result, it seems subsidy use may work to increase supply, but there is little 
evidence that subsidies alone are able to leverage improved quality.  
There is some evidence that children receiving subsidy experience lower quality 
care. For example, Jones-Branch, Torquati, Raikes, & Edwards (2004) found programs 
with children receiving subsidies provide significantly lower quality care based on 
ECERS-R scores (M = 3.3 versus 4.2, respectively). More specifically, language-
reasoning (M = 3.0 versus 4.8), activities (M = 2.2 versus 3.2), and interactions (M = 3.9 
versus 5.2) were negatively related to the inclusion of children receiving subsides. That 
is, the learning environments of children receiving subsidy were of lower quality 
compared to the learning environments of child care programs not serving children 
receiving subsidy. This correlation is a reminder of the multiple risk factors that intersect 
for children experiencing poverty. Additionally, in a multivariate analysis, subsidy density 
was negatively related to global quality and teacher salary. That is, the greater number 
of children receiving child care subsidy in a classroom, the greater the likelihood that 
teachers had significantly less education and lower classroom quality. This finding was 
also replicated by Cassidy, Lower, Kintner, and Hestenes (2009). While subsidy may 
assist families in accessing formal child care, the programs that seem most accessible to 
these families - with the greatest density of children receiving subsidy - seem to be of 
lower quality. Subsidy may be improving the likelihood that children are in licensed care 
but, there still seems to be discrepancies in the quality of the licensed care accessed 
compared to their more affluent peers. 
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In contrast, there is some evidence that suggests a positive association between 
child care subsidy receipt and child care quality (Fuller, Raudenbush, Wei, & Holloway, 
1993). Rigby, Ryan and Brooks-Gunn (2007) found that across 14 states more generous 
subsidy rates were associated with higher quality child care among non-profit centers 
and increased the likelihood that children were in center-based care rather than with 
family or kith and kin care. There is evidence that subsidy increases purchasing power; 
however, whether or not subsidy can act to ensure children are in high quality programs 
is debatable and likely depends on other state and federal policies. These results 
emphasize the important role that subsidies can play in alleviating the cost of child care 
and increasing purchasing power among poor families. However, it is premature to rely 
on subsidy policies to ensure that children in poverty are in the high quality 
arrangements that can promote their optimal social and cognitive development. 
Child Care Policy and Enhancement Efforts 
National and state policies have promoted child care initiatives with the intent of 
improving quality. For example, federally, the Child Care and Development Fund 
(CCDF) administered by the Child Care Bureau of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services Administration for Children and Families distributes funds to states to 
aid low-income working families with child care costs and to fund quality enhancement 
initiatives (Child Care Bureau, 2007). In 2006, 4.8 billion dollars were distributed to 
States, Tribes, and Territories impacting 1.8 million children. In 2009, this increased to 7 
billion dollars including 2 billion dollars from the American Recovery and Investment Act 
(Child Care Bureau, 2009). Seventy percent of the funds were mandated to be granted 
to families receiving, transitioning from, or at risk of qualifying for Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF). Subsidy funds granted to families are in the form of 
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vouchers that may be used in a variety of child care settings (e.g. centers, homes, kin) 
based on parent choice. Additionally, at least 4% of the funds must be used by states on 
initiatives to improve child care quality. For example, North Carolina, like many other 
states (e.g., Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Illinois) allocated these funds to implement a 
rated license with the intention of increasing child care quality across the state. States 
receiving CCDF funds are mandated to develop a plan to ensure equal access to child 
care programs to families utilizing subsidies compared to families not eligible. In 2009, 
10 million dollars were allocated for research and evaluation (Child Care Bureau, 2009).  
Although further evaluative mechanisms are needed to ensure access to high 
quality child care, there is strong support that state regulatory policies are related to child 
care quality (Fuller, Raudenbush, Wei, & Holloway, 1993; Phillips, Howes, & Whitebook, 
1992; Rigby, Ryan, & Brooks-Gunn, 2007). However, this relationship is complex.  For 
example, in states with more stringent regulations and higher quality child care, children 
were less likely to be in formal care (Rigby, Ryan, & Brooks-Gunn). That is, stricter 
regulations, which may increase quality, may also reduce supply, requiring families to 
resort to more informal arrangements that may be of lower quality. An alternative 
explanation is that more stringent state regulations result in licensed child care that is too 
expensive for low-income families and subsequently forces families to choose 
unlicensed child care of questionable quality. Additionally, a study of child care centers 
across three California counties found that counties with higher levels of subsidy dollars 
had higher structural quality promoted by state quality standards (Fuller, Holloway, 
Bozzi, Burr, Cohen, & Suzuki, 2003).  However, in counties where family demand for 
child care was above supply, the structural quality was compromised resulting in worse 
teacher-child ratios. In this example, because of the demand, there was more room in 
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the supply of the mixed market for lower quality child care to sustain itself. Interestingly 
family demand and subsequently lower structural quality was most prevalent in working-
class communities with high Latino populations also at risk for poverty.   
In an effort to improve quality, some states have responded by implementing 
Quality Rating Systems. The National Child Care Information Center (2007) defines a 
Quality Rating System (QRS) as “a systemic approach to assess, improve, and 
communicate the level of quality in early care and education programs”. However, 
additional research is needed to determine if such efforts actually promote equitable 
access to higher quality child care across community contexts (Adams, Tout, & Zaslow, 
2007) or further exploit the disparity between programs serving children in poverty 
compared to their more affluent peers. More recently, QRS are referred to as Quality 
Rating and Improvement Systems, emphasizing the need for improvement efforts to be 
a part of this regulatory approach. Additionally, some states have tiered subsidy 
reimbursement rates for child care programs with varying levels of quality (i.e. programs 
meeting higher standards receive higher rates). However, Cassidy, Lower, Kintner, & 
Hestenes (2009) reveal how this practice may in fact perpetuate inequitable resources 
for programs serving children in poverty. That is, in this particular study, child care 
subsidy rates were tied to star rating in the state’s QRIS. Classrooms with African 
American teachers had 24% more children receiving subsidy than classrooms with 
European American teachers. Classrooms with African American teachers also faced 
contextual barriers (e.g. lower teacher education, larger class sizes) resulting in lower 
global quality scores.  Consequently, the classrooms with African American teachers 
and children - with 24% more children on subsidy, lower global quality scores, and fewer 
“stars” -  received lower subsidy rates despite their need for additional resources.   
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Despite market constraints, efforts to increase supply through county funding and 
quality enhancement efforts seem to be effective. That is, the use of county level funds 
for child care quality enhancement seems to increase supply of higher quality child care. 
For example, a study examining the effects of Smart Start in North Carolina on 180 child 
care programs within 12 counties (using hierarchical linear modeling) found the 
proportion of funding allocated by Smart Start used on child care activities was positively 
related to county child care quality scores (Bryant, Maxwell, & Burchinal, 1999). In fact, 
the proportion of funding used by Smart Start on child care efforts better predicted 
quality than the extent to which Smart Start partnerships were allocated full or partial 
funding, although full funding still yielded significantly better results. Additionally, the 
extent to which child care programs participated in quality improvement activities, the 
higher their global quality was rated.  
North Carolina Context 
In North Carolina, 25% of children under 3 and 22% of children 3 to 5 are living in 
poverty, representative of the national rate of 22%.  Expanding the statistics to include 
children living in families that are 200% above the poverty level, 45% of children under 3 
and 47% of children 3 to 5 are living in these low-income households, representative of 
the national rate of 46% (National Center for Children in Poverty, 2010a; 2010b). With 
the PRWORA increasing the demand for child care among low-income families, 
examining the impact of QRIS policies in communities of different socioeconomic 
contexts is critical to ensuring equitable access to high quality child care that supports 
optimal development among children in poverty. 
Access to high quality child care is important for all families across communities; 
it enables parents to work and it enhances children’s development and school readiness 
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(Trail, Wohl, & Estess, 2004). In North Carolina, 99% of children younger than six living 
200% above the poverty level and 82% of young children living below this threshold 
have at least one working parent (National Center for Children in Poverty, 2010a). Child 
care is a needed resource among working parents across all income levels. However, it 
is difficult to balance the demand for child care and equitable access to high quality 
settings, especially in low-income communities. Although the North Carolina Quality 
Rating and Improvement System (QRIS) informs the child care market, there is no 
evidence that there is equitable access to the highest quality programs. On the contrary, 
there is evidence that children of color and children living in poverty are most likely to 
experience low quality child care (Helburn, 1995; Howes, Sakai, Shinn, Phillips, 
Galinsky, & Whitebook, 1995; Cassidy, Lower, Kintner, & Hestenes, 2009).  
In the current study, the concentration of children from low-income families within 
programs was based on the state and federal funds received by programs to reduce or 
alleviate the cost of the program to families. Subsidy funds from the North Caorlina 
Division of Child Development and funds from Early Head Start, Head Start, and More-
at-Four (state pre-K) were included. Some programs, like Head Start and More-at-Four 
focus on serving children from low-income families and classrooms are often made up of 
predominately children living in poverty and of color. In contrast, some programs may be 
more heterogeneous in terms of families of low socioeconomic backgrounds. In the 
current study, the amount of funds received to cover or subsidize the cost of care for 
children in relation to the program capacity provided a proxy for the concentration of 
children from low-income families attending the programs and the degree to which 
programs received state and federal funding. 
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The North Carolina Office of School Readiness oversees the implementation of 
Early Head Start, Head Start, and the state pre-Kindergarten program (More-at-Four) in 
child care programs. Both Head Start and More-at-Four programs are considered 
program-based models targeted for children from low-income households to promote 
school readiness and decrease the achievement gap. Head Start (and Early Head Start) 
is a federally funded family focused program designed to promote social and cognitive 
development by “meeting emotional, social, health, nutritional, and psychological needs 
of children and their families” (North Carolina Office of School Readiness, 2010a). More-
at-Four is a state funded Pre-K program based on North Carolina’s early learning 
standards that promote school readiness by engaging children in active learning around 
approaches to learning, emotional and social development, health and physical 
development, language development and communication, and cognitive development 
(North Carolina Office of School Readiness, 2010b). Both programs utilize research-
based curriculums, and have enhanced standards for teacher education and training, 
class size, and staff-child ratios. 
In an effort to improve access to high quality child care for all children, North 
Carolina legislation allocates funds to the North Carolina Partnership for Children to 
distribute among all the 100 counties through 78 Smart Start offices across the state. 
The appropriation for 2007 – 2008 was $205.5 million dollars (North Carolina 
Partnership for Children, 2008). According to the North Carolina Partnership for 
Children, “Smart Start funds are used to improve the quality of child care, make child 
care more affordable and accessible, provide access to health services and offer family 
support”. Based on past expenditures, the majority of funds are used to grant child care 
subsidies to families in need and to enhance child care quality. Furthermore, the North 
30 
 
Carolina Partnership for Children is a nationally recognized model being replicated in 
other states. While there is evidence that Smart Start funds have improved child care 
quality (Bryant, Maxwell, & Burchinal, 1999) and made such programs more affordable 
to families through subsidies, the current study proposes to examine the extent to which 
these funds may change the way in which socioeconomic contexts of communities and 
child care quality are related.  
In the current study, the county child care funding context was defined by the 
funds allocated to the 78 Smart Start county offices utilized for child care quality 
enhancement initiatives in the 100 North Carolina counties. Smart Start offices that 
cover more than one county do so due to the population density of the area. When 
counties are referenced, it is based on the boundaries of the 78 Smart Start offices.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 
RQ1. To what extent does child care quality vary across community contexts of varying 
macroscopicity, such as zip codes and counties? 
• H1a. Child care quality will vary more across counties than across zip codes. 
RQ2. What is the relationship between program level characteristics (program type, 
capacity, extended care) and child care quality? 
• H2a. Child care centers will be higher in quality compared to child care homes. 
• H2b. Capacity will be negatively related to child care quality. 
• H2c. Extended care will be negatively related to child care quality. 
RQ3. What is the relationship between the concentration of state and federal funding 
(More-at-Four, Head Start, Division of Child Development subsidy) and child care 
quality? 
• H3a. More-at-Four funding will be positively related to child care quality. 
• H3b. Head Start funding will be positively related to child care quality. 
• H3c. Division of Child Development subsidy will be negatively related to child 
care quality.  
RQ4. What is the relationship between the socioeconomic context of communities and 
child care quality? 
• H4a. Concentrated disadvantage (percent below the poverty line, percent 
receiving public assistance, percent unemployed, percent female-headed 
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families with children, and percent black) will be negatively related to child care 
quality. 
•  H4b. Concentrated immigration (percent Latino, percent foreign born) will be 
negatively related to child care quality. 
• H4c. Residential stability (percent of residents five years old and older who 
resided in the same house five years earlier, percent of own-occupied homes) 
will be positively related to child care quality. 
• H4d. Concentrated affluence (percent of families with incomes higher than 
$75,000, percent of adults with a college education, percent civilian labor force 
employed in professional or managerial occupations) will be positively related to 
child care quality. 
• H4e. Concentration of White population will be positively related to child care 
quality.  
RQ5. To what extent does county level Smart Start funding influence the relationship 
between the socioeconomic context of communities and child care quality?   
• H5a. Smart Start quality enhancement funding will be positively related to quality.  
• H5b. The allocation of county level Smart Start funding for quality enhancement 
will have a moderating effect in the two-level model examining the relationship 
between child care quality and community socioeconomic context. 
RQ6. Under what conditions do child care programs more likely participate in the 
voluntary environment rating scale assessments? 
• H6a. Child care programs that participate in the voluntary environment rating 
scale assessment are more likely to be in zip codes with lower concentrated 
disadvantage. 
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• H6b.  Child care programs that participate in the voluntary environment rating 
scale assessment are more likely to be in zip codes with lower concentrated 
immigration. 
• H6c. Child care programs that participate in the voluntary environment rating 
scale assessment are more likely to be in zip codes with higher residential 
stability.  
• H6d. Child care programs that participate in the voluntary environment rating 
scale assessment are more likely to be in zip codes with higher concentrated 
affluence.  
• H6e. Child care programs that participate in the voluntary environment rating 
scale assessment are more likely to be in zip codes with a greater percentage of 
White population.  
• H6f. Child care programs that participate in the voluntary environment rating 
scale assessment are more likely to be in counties that have more funds 
allocated for quality enhancement. 
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CHAPTER V 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Research Design 
The purpose of the study was to examine: (a) the variation in child care quality 
across communities of various sizes (zip codes versus counties), (b) the relationship 
between state and federal funding and child care quality, (c) the relationship between 
child care quality and the socioeconomic context of communities, (d) the extent county 
level Smart Start funding influences the relationship between the socioeconomic context 
of communities and child care quality, and (d) the socioeconomic contexts of child care 
programs participating and not participating in the statewide QRIS voluntary assessment 
process.   
The study utilized a cross-sectional design and multiple data sources including 
regulatory data from the North Carolina Division of Child Development, observation data 
from the North Carolina Rated License Assessment Project, survey data from the United 
States Census Bureau, and administrative data from the North Carolina State Head Start 
Collaboration Office, North Carolina Office of School Readiness, and the North Carolina 
Partnership for Children.  
The data sources utilized unique procedures – survey, regulatory, observation, 
and administrative. Each data source resulted from a unique method of data collection 
and multiple informants. Including all licensed child care programs in the state of North 
Carolina that serve children birth through 5-years ensured a low risk of selection 
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effects and a large sample size to have adequate power for hierarchical linear modeling. 
As such, this strong research design yielded valid generalizable data useful for policy 
recommendations.   
Measures 
Child Care Quality 
Licensing points.  The total licensing points earned (out of 15) from the Division 
of Child Development as of September 25, 2008 was used as a measure of child care 
quality. The Division of Child Development assigns a star rating to all licensed child care 
programs. For example, 1-3 points earned in the rated license equates to 1 star, 4-6 
points equates to 2 stars, 7-9 points equates to 3 stars, 10-12 points equates to 4 stars, 
and 13-15 points equates to 5 stars. The star rating is figured from a total number of 
points out of 15 based on education standards and program standards. Out of the15 
points, programs can earn up to 7 points in education standards and 7 points in program 
standards with an additional “quality point” that may be achieved through enhanced 
teacher education requirements, approved curriculum adoption, or other options. Points 
are earned towards the education standards based on teacher and administrative 
education levels and experience. Points are earned toward the program standards 
based on operating and personnel policies, number of activity areas in classrooms, 
square footage per classroom, staff child ratios, and the results from a voluntary 
Environment Rating Scale assessment. All points attributed to the education standards 
and program standards, with the exception of the Environment Rating Scale 
assessment, measure structural quality. Therefore, measurement of quality for programs 
not participating in the Environment Rating Scale assessment is based on structural 
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quality. The purpose of using the total licensing points earned versus the star rating is to 
allow for greater variation among programs. 
Environment Rating Scales. To achieve the highest star ratings (4 or 5 stars), 
programs must volunteer for an Environment Rating Scale (ERS) assessment. Scores 
from the assessment impact the total licensing points earned towards the programs 
standards component of the rated license. The Environment Rating Scales (Infant 
Toddler Environment Rating Scale – Revised, Harms, Cryer, & Clifford, 2003; Early 
Childhood Environment Rating Scale – Revised, Harms, Clifford, & Cryer, 2005; and the 
Family Child Care Home Environment Rating Scale, Harms & Clifford, 1989) are widely 
used measures of global quality. The Environment Rating Scales were designed as 
observational measures that typically require three to five hours of observation and a 
teacher interview.  Based on the observation, items are scored from 1 (inadequate) to 7 
(excellent). Items are averaged to determine a global quality score. The ERS contain 
high levels of face and content validity by addressing important characteristics and 
practices that describe the level of quality in early care and education and contain 
acceptable levels of internal consistency (ITERS-R α = .93; ECERS-R α = .92; FDCRS 
subscale α’s range from .70 - .93) . In addition to research, they are used as a part of 
regulatory enhancement programs in 15 states including North Carolina. The North 
Carolina Rated License Assessment Project is the organization responsible for all 
assessments in North Carolina. Assessors maintain an inter-rater reliability of at least 
85% within one point. The use of well trained reliable assessors protects against 
inaccurate results attributed to the way observers score observations.  
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Program Characteristics 
Program Type (center or family child care home), licensed capacity, and 
extended care (licensed for second and/or third shift care) were included as program 
level characteristics. To normalize the distribution of licensed capacity the natural log 
was computed for analyses. Additionally, interactions between program type and 
licensed capacity and program type and extended care were tested.  
Funding received from More-at-Four, Head Start, and the Division of Child 
Development (DCD) were used as proxies to determine the concentration of children 
from low-income families attending the programs that accessed state or federal funding. 
Three separate variables were computed – one for Head Start funds, one for More-at-
Four funds, and one for DCD funds. The More-at-Four and Head Start funds were from 
the 2007-2008 school year and the DCD funds were from the 2008 fiscal year. Program 
level DCD and More-at-Four funds were merged with the licensing data based on the 
unique program facility identification numbers. Head Start funding including Early Head 
Start was received at the level of the funding agency. To include these funds 
approximations were computed for each program who received funds from the 
respective agencies. For example, programs were allocated funds proportionally based 
on the number of programs funded within each of the agencies and the licensing 
capacity of each of the programs. To adjust for the positively skewed distributions of the 
data, 1 plus the natural log of More-at-Four, Head Start, and DCD funding divided by 
licensed capacity was computed for analyses. Correlations among the program level 
variables are reported in Table 1.  
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Community Socioeconomic Context 
Census data. The Decennial Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3) data set was 
used for the current study. SF3 includes variables measuring socioeconomics at low 
level geographies such as zip codes (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). Approximately 1 in 6 
households are included in the sample and weighted to the population. Based on 
Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls (1999), the following scales were used to examine 
socioeconomic differences between communities at the zip code level: (1) concentrated 
disadvantage; (2) concentrated immigration; (3) residential stability; and (4) concentrated 
affluence. More specifically, the variables constituting concentrated disadvantage 
include: percent population below the poverty line, percent households receiving public 
assistance, percent individuals 16 and over in labor force unemployed, percent female-
headed families with children, and percent Black or African American. The variables 
constituting concentrated immigration include: percent Latino and percent foreign born. 
The variables constituting residential stability include: percent of residents five years old 
and older who resided in the same house five years earlier and the percent of owner-
occupied homes. The variables constituting concentrated affluence include: percent of 
families with incomes $75,000 or higher, percent of adults with a college education, and 
percent of civilian labor force employed in professional or managerial occupations. The 
aforementioned scales were utilized instead of variables as single measures in the 
model because many of the variables were highly correlated (see Table 2). To address 
this issue of multicollinearity, Burchinal, Roberts, Hooper, and Zeisel (2000) suggest 
using factor scores to reduce the number of predictors that are highly correlated. The 
factor scores were more modestly correlated (see Table 3). Because of the history of 
segregation in North Carolina, race (percent White) was also added as a single variable.  
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County Funding Context 
Smart Start Funding. County Smart Start funds, used for child care quality 
enhancement efforts, measured the county funding context. Funding allocations by 
county Smart Start offices were obtained through the North Carolina Partnership for 
Children. There are a total of 78 Smart Start offices covering the 100 North Carolina 
counties. For purposes of the current study, county boundaries were based on the 
coverage of the 78 Smart Start offices. Funds used by each Smart Start agency were 
coded with a “purpose service code”. Because Smart Start agencies provide a variety of 
services to support children and families in communities, these codes were used to 
specifically identify funds that were intended to improve the quality of early care and 
education. Funds specifically used for the following reasons were summed: quality 
enhancement (upgrades and maintenance), child care resource and referral services, 
professional development, child care support services, professional development 
supplements, provider training, learning materials and teaching aids, health benefits for 
child care providers, increase child care availability, Head Start expansion (i.e. early a.m. 
and p.m. services), child care cost supports, and supplement for quality. To adjust for 
positively skewed distributions of the data, the natural log of Smart Start quality 
enhancement funds was computed for analyses. 
Sample 
The population studied included nearly all licensed child care (family child care 
homes and centers) in North Carolina. The licensing data was received from the North 
Carolina Division of Child Development on September 25, 2008. At that time there were 
8903 programs in the dataset. The licensing data included the zip codes of the program 
locations which allowed the data to be merged with the census data at the zip code 
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level. Two hundred fifty-four programs did not have census information that 
corresponded with their zip code therefore they were removed from the data set. 
Additionally, public school PreK and Afterschool programs (n = 1076) were removed 
from the data. Furthermore, 613 programs were exempt from quality rating requirements 
(n = 364 religious exemption; n = 221 temporary license; n = 28 provisional license) and 
therefore were removed from the data set. An additional 78 programs were dropped 
from the dataset because they had not yet converted to the two-component licensing 
system. The final sample size that resulted was 6882 programs nested within 619 zip 
codes. Of these, 3725 were family child care homes and 3157 were child care centers.  
Programs with 1 to 5 stars were represented in the data including 1495 one star 
programs (n = 1136 homes, n = 359 centers), 1209 two star programs (n = 815 homes, 
394 centers), 1505 three star programs (n = 634 homes, n = 871 centers), 1592 four star 
programs (n = 672 homes, n = 920 centers), and 1081 five star programs (n = 468 
homes, 613 centers). Of the 6882 programs, licensing points averaged 7.14 (SD = 
4.677) with a range of 0 to 15 points.  
Licensing data from the Division of Child Development was merged with subsidy, 
Head Start, and More-at-Four data based on the unique facility identification number 
assigned by the Division of Child Development for the purpose of licensing. Furthermore, 
5360 (78%) programs received DCD subsidy funding, 282 (4%) received Head Start 
funding, and 439 (6%) received More-at-Four funding. There were 47 programs that 
received funds from all three sources, 39 programs that received Head Start and DCD 
funds, 277 programs that received More-at-Four and DCD funds, 104 programs that 
received Head Start and More-at-Four funds, 5003 programs that just received DCD 
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funds, 92 programs that only received Head Start funds, 17 programs that only received 
More-at-Four funds, and 1309 that received no funds from any of the three sources. 
The vast majority of child care programs interested in earning higher star ratings 
(i.e. 3, 4, or 5 stars) request an Environment Rating Scale (ERS) assessment to be 
conducted. These assessments are conducted by the North Carolina Rated License 
Assessment Project and scores are stored in the DCD licensing database. From the 
current sample (n = 6882), 2964 programs (n = 1061 homes, 1903 centers) participated 
in the voluntary ERS assessment. Of these programs, 1 had one star (center), 115 had 
two stars (n = 35 homes, n = 80 centers), 489 had 3 stars (n = 135 homes, n = 354 
centers), 1278 had four stars (n = 423 homes, n = 855 centers), and 1081 had five stars 
(n = 468 homes, n = 613 centers). Furthermore, the sub-sample programs had an 
average of 11.16 licensing points (SD = 2.504) with a range of 3 to 15 points. The mean 
ERS score was 5.13 (SD = .60) with a range of 1 to 6.83. Because the assessment 
process is a voluntary part of the rated license, these data were hypothesized to 
disproportionally represent higher quality programs in the state. Identifying the kinds of 
programs participating in the voluntary assessment of the licensing process enabled an 
examination of selection effects of the current policy by comparing the socioeconomic 
contexts of programs participating and not participating in the assessment.  
At the zip code level, the average concentrated disadvantage was 13% (SD = 
.07) with a range of 2% to 41% for the full- and sub-sample. The average concentrated 
immigration was 5% for the full-sample and 6% for the sub-sample (SD = .04) with a 
range of 0 to 45%. The average residential stability was 60% for the full-sample and 
59% for the sub-sample (SD = .10) with a range of 6% to 91%. The average 
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concentrated affluence was 22% (SD = .10) for the full-sample (23% (SD = .11) for the 
sub-sample) with a range of 0% for the full-sample (4% for the sub-sample) to 65%.  
The internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) of the community socioeconomic 
context measures was examined. The concentrated disadvantage scale yielded an 
alpha of .69, concentrated immigration scale yielded an alpha of .90, the residential 
stability scale yielded an alpha of .68, and the concentrated affluence scale yielded an 
alpha of .95.  Based on the these results, the concentrated immigration scale and the 
concentrated affluence scale have a lower bound estimates of reliability that is 
sufficiently high to have confidence in the scales whereas the lower bound estimate of 
reliability for the concentrated disadvantage and the residential stability scales suggest 
greater caution in interpretation of these effects.  
The concentration of White population was not included because it was highly 
correlated (-.92, p ≤.00 for the full- and sub-samples) negatively with concentrated 
disadvantage. Due to multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor for White was 7.69 
suggesting it was not needed in the model as long as concentrated disadvantage was 
included. Table 2 includes the correlations among the variables used in the scales 
measuring the socioeconomic context of communities and table 3 includes the 
correlations among the four scales. 
Because zip codes can share more than one county, data reduction was required 
so that zip codes did not overlap counties. Programs with zip codes that were in more 
than one county were individually examined. Based on the majority of a zip code nested 
in a single county, a dominant county was chosen. The programs with a shared zip code 
but a county that deviated from the dominant county were deleted from the data set. This 
reduced the sample by 155 programs. Therefore, in the 3-level full sample model, the 
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sample size included 6727 programs nested within the 78 Smart Start county or 
“partnership” offices. On average, Smart Start allocated $1,400,439 (SD = $1,856,728) 
for child care quality enhancement initiatives at the level of the Smart Start county 
(partnership) with a range of $85,030 to $11,103,050. Because the quality enhancement 
dollars were negatively skewed, the natural log of this variable was used to normalize 
the curve, resulting in a mean of 13.64 (SD = .998) and a range of 11.35 to 16.22.   
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CHAPTER VI 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
 
 
 
Preliminary analyses were conducted using SPSS16. The internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha) of the community socioeconomic context measures was examined. 
Where necessary, variable and scale distributions were examined to confirm normality. 
Highly non-normal distributions were transformed and zero-order correlations were 
conducted. Hypotheses were tested using HLM6, software developed for examining data 
that are hierarchical in structure. Using HLM6 to analyze nested data protected statistical 
conclusion validity, by properly accounting for non-independence of programs nested 
within zip codes and counties. Overall, three levels of nesting were included in analyses 
with child care programs at level 1 nested within zip codes (level 2) nested within 
counties (level 3).  
Unconditional Models 
Initial testing began with unconditional 2-level models based on Raudenbush and 
Bryk (2002). 
Level 1 Model 
yij = β0i + rij  
 
where: 
yij = total licensing points (or ERS score) of the j
th program within the ith zip code (or county). 
β0i = level 1 intercept term for programs within the i
th zip code (or county).  
rij = level 1residual of the j
th program within the ith zip code, or the deviation of the estimated  
quality (licensing points or ERS score) of the jth program within the ith zip code from its 
predicted value based on the level 1 regression model. 
 
Level 2 Model 
β0i = γ00 + u0i
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where: 
β0i = level 1 intercept term for programs within the i
th zip code (or county).  
γ00 = level 2 intercept term. 
u0i = level 2 residual. It reflects the degree to which there is substantial zip code to zip code (or  
county to county) variation. 
 
Additional assumptions of the unconditional HLM model includes: 
rij ~ N(0,2), or level 1 residuals are normally distributed with a mean of 0 and homogeneous 
variance of 2. 
u0i ~ N(0,00), or level 2 residuals are normally distributed with a mean of 0 and variance of 00. 
Cov(rij, u0i) = or level 1 residuals and level 2 residuals are uncorrelated.   
 
Unconditional models allow for the unambiguous partitioning of total variability into 
components between and within programs, zip codes, and/or counties. No predictor 
variables are included. Unconditional models are of primary interest because they allow 
for estimation of intraclass correlations (ICCs), or the fraction of variability attributable to 
the heterogeneity of zip codes and/or counties relative to the total variability observed 
among programs, zip codes, and/or counties.  Unconditional models were also used to 
decide, based on higher ICCs, whether the most appropriate two-level models were 
programs nested within zip codes rather than programs nested within counties.   
Conditional 2-Level Models 
Conditional (means as outcomes) 2-level models were built based on 
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). Conditional 2-level models include a set of predictors at 
level 1 and/or level 2 while taking into account dependencies associated with the 
hierarchical data structure (e.g. child care programs nested within zip codes). For 
example, in predicting child care quality, characteristics of the program (level 1) may be 
included (e.g. a binary variable indicating whether the program is a family child care 
home or center); while at level 2, characteristics of the community in which the program 
is nested may also be included (e.g. concentrated disadvantage).   
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The first step in building conditional models begins by identifying an effective 
level 1 model. The effective level 1 model includes all level 1 (program level) predictors 
and necessary random effects. A level 1 effective model is identified by reducing a full 
model that includes all level 1 variables and theoretically driven random effects. For 
example, a random effect may be included if it is plausible that the magnitude of the 
relationship between the predictor (e.g. program type) and the outcome variable (e.g. 
child care quality) varies across groups (e.g. zip codes). All level 1 full models in the 
current study included random effects for the intercept (u0), program type (u1), licensed 
capacity (u4), and DCD subsidy funding (u8).  
Level 1 Model 
yij = β0i + β1i(program typeij) + β2i(extended careij)+ β3i(program typeij * extended careij) + 
β4i(licensed capacityij) + β5i(program typeij * licensed capacityij) + β6i(Head Start fundingij) + 
β7i(More-at-Four fundingij) + β8i(DCD subsidy fundingij) + rij  
where: 
yij = total licensing points (or ERS score) of the j
th program within the ith zip code.  
β0i = level 1 intercept term for programs within the i
th zip code. It also refers to the estimated 
quality of a hypothetical reference program (within each zip code) that is a home provider, 
without extended care, a licensed capacity of 0, and no Head Start, More-at-Four, or DCD 
subsidy funding.   
βxi = level 1 regression coefficient relating the x
th program characteristic to licensing points (or 
ERS score) within the ith zip code.   
rij = level 1 residual of the j
th program within the ith zip code, or the deviation of the estimated 
quality (licensing points or ERS score) for the jth program within the ith zip code from its 
predicted value based on the level 1 regression model. 
 
It is assumed that rij ~ N(0,2), or level 1 residuals are normally distributed with a mean of 0 and 
homogeneous variance of 2. 
 
Overall, the level 1 model describes the prediction of licensing points (or ERS score) of 
individual programs (nested within particular zip codes) from program level predictors.   
 
Level 2 Model 
β0i = γ00 + u0i 
β1i = γ10 + u1i 
β2i = γ20  
β3i = γ30 
β4i = γ40+ u4i 
β5i = γ50  
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β6i = γ60 
β7i = γ70 
β8i = γ80 + u8i 
 
where: 
βxi = level 1 regression coefficient relating the x
th program characteristic (or intercept) to licensing 
points (or ERS score) within the ith zip code.   
γx0 = level 2 intercept for predicting the x
th program characteristic. It also represents the main 
effect of the xth program characteristic in a mixed model formulation of the hierarchical 
linear model.   
uxi = level 2 residual associated with the x
th program characteristic. It reflects the degree to which 
there is substantial zip code to zip code variation in the relationship between the xth level 1 
program characteristic and program quality (licensing points or ERS score).   
 
Overall, level 2 models without additional level 2 predictors capture the fixed effects of level 1 
terms, as well as heterogeneity between zip codes in level 1 parameters for designated terms.    
 
Additional assumptions of the standard HLM model includes: 
rij ~ N(0,2), or level 1 residuals are normally distributed with a mean of 0 and homogeneous 
variance of 2. 
uxi ~ N(0,xx), or level 2 residuals are normally distributed with a mean of 0 and variance of xx. 
Cov(uxi, uzi) = xz, or the covariances between pairs of level 2 residuals = xz. 
Cov(rij, uxi) = or level 1 residuals and level 2 residuals are uncorrelated.   
 
Since the heterogeneity of level 1 (program) effects across zip codes is maximal 
before level 2 (community) predictors are added to the model, model comparisons based 
on likelihood ratio tests of deviance statistics were used to reduce the number of random 
effects in the level 1 full model to an empirically determined, minimally necessary set.  
Also, since one of the assumptions of HLM is homogeneity of level 1 variances [i.e. rij ~ 
N(0,2)] across groups (e.g. zip codes), each full level 1 model was tested for 
homogeneity of level 1 variance. If heterogeneity across groups was detected, level 1 
variables were entered as predictors of the variance heterogeneity in order to account 
for it (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, pp.263-265; Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, Congdon, & 
du Toit, 2004, pp. 52-53).  In all cases where level 1 variance heterogeneity was 
observed, program type accounted for it.   
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The level 1 effective model was the foundation for adding level 2 (zip code) 
predictor variables including: concentrated disadvantage, concentrated immigration, 
residential stability, and concentrated affluence. For level 1 coefficients with random 
effects, the level 2 variables were added to help “explain” the heterogeneity among 
programs (nested within zip codes) implied by the random effect. For level 1 coefficients 
without random effects, predictors were included in order to test theoretically grounded 
cross-level interactions implied by the model. For example, if a random effect was 
included for program type and DCD subsidy funding, level 2 interactions were included 
in order to help explain the variance components. If a random effect was not needed for 
a level 1 predictor (e.g. extended care, Head Start funding, More-at-Four funding), yet a 
theoretically plausible reason suggested a possible interaction with level 1 variables, 
they were included as noted in the example below.    
Level 1 Model 
yij = β0i + β1i(program typeij) + β2i(extended careij)+ β3i(program typeij * extended careij) + 
β4i(licensed capacityij) + β5i(program typeij * licensed capacityij) + β6i(Head Start fundingij) + 
β7i(More-at-Four fundingij) + β8i(DCD subsidy fundingij) + rij  
All level 1 terms are defined as in the previous model. 
 
Level 2 Model 
β0i = γ00 + γ01(disadvantagei) + γ02(immigrationi) + γ03(residential stabilityi) + γ04(affluencei) + u0i 
β1i = γ10 + γ11(disadvantagei) + γ12(immigrationi) + γ13(residential stabilityi) + γ14(affluencei) + u1i 
β2i = γ20 + γ21(disadvantagei) + γ22(immigrationi) + γ23(residential stabilityi) + γ24(affluencei) 
β3i = γ30 
β4i = γ40 
β5i = γ50  
β6i = γ60+ γ61(disadvantagei) + γ62(immigrationi) + γ63(residential stabilityi) + γ64(affluencei) 
β7i = γ70+ γ71(disadvantagei) + γ72(immigrationi) + γ73(residential stabilityi) + γ74(affluencei) 
β8i = γ80+γ81(disadvantagei) + γ82(immigrationi) + γ83(residential stabilityi) + γ84(affluencei) + u8i 
 
where: 
βxi = level 1 regression coefficient relating the x
th program characteristic to licensing points (or 
ERS score) within the ith zip code.   
γ00 = level 2 intercept for predicting the i
th zip code’s intercept value.  In a mixed model 
formulation of the hierarchical linear model, it also represents the average zip code intercept, 
or overall intercept value.  
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γ0z = the level 2 regression coefficient for predicting the i
th zip code’s intercept value from the zth 
zip code characteristic.  In a mixed model formulation, it represents the main effect of the zth 
zip code characteristic.  
γx0 = level 2 intercept for predicting the coefficient of the x
th program characteristic.  It also 
represents the main effect of the xth program characteristic in a mixed model formulation of 
the hierarchical linear model.   
γxz =  the level 2 regression coefficient for predicting the coefficient of the x
th program 
characteristic from the zth zip code characteristic.  In a mixed model formulation, it 
represents the cross-level interaction between the xth program characteristic and the zth zip 
code characteristic.  
uxi = conditional level 2 residual associated with the x
th program characteristic.  It reflects the 
degree to which there remains substantial zip code to zip code variation in the relationship 
between the xth level 1 program characteristic and program quality (licensing points or ERS 
score) after taking all level 1 and level 2 terms, main effects, and interactions included in the 
model into account.   
 
Additional assumptions of a two-level model that includes level 2 covariates are the same as 
described above for the unconditional growth model.   
 
Overall, level 2 models with additional level 2 predictors capture the fixed effects of level 1 and 2 
terms and interactions between level 1 and 2 terms as well as heterogeneity between zip codes in 
level 1 parameters for designated terms.    
 
After fitting the full level 2 model, the model was reduced through a series of 
stages using model comparisons to determine the minimal necessary set of predictors 
for each level 1 coefficient.  All model comparisons were guided by Wald tests, but 
finalized through likelihood ratio tests referenced against the full level 2 model 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, p.56-65).  Nonsignificant interactions were reduced followed by 
main effect terms that were not significant. Reduction of the full level 2 model implied by 
the minimal set of predictors resulted in the effective level 2 model.   
Moderating 3-Level Models 
A conditional (means as outcomes) 3-level model was used based on 
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) to determine the moderating effect of county level Smart 
Start funds on 2-level quality models. That is, the 3-level model allowed for changes in 
the 2-level model when taking the clustering of zip codes into Smart Start county 
regions, as well as the Smart Start quality enhancement funds into account. Unless 
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otherwise noted, the 2-level effective model (described below) was used as the 
foundation for adding the third level terms.  (See the full 2-level model for definitions of 
terms.)  
Level 1 Model 
yij = β0i + β1i(program typeij) + β2i(extended careij)+ β3i(program typeij * extended careij) + 
β4i(licensed capacityij) + β5i(program typeij * licensed capacityij) + β6i(Head Start fundingij) + 
β7i(More-at-Four fundingij) + β8i(DCD subsidy fundingij) + rij  
Level 2 Model 
β0i = γ00 + γ01(disadvantagei) + γ02(residential stabilityi) + γ03(affluencei) + u0i 
β1i = γ10 + γ11(disadvantagei) + u1i 
β2i = γ20  
β3i = γ30 
β4i = γ40 
β5i = γ50  
β6i = γ60+ γ61(affluencei) 
β7i = γ70+ γ71(disadvantagei)  
β8i = γ80 + γ81(affluencei) + u8i 
 
A 3-level full model was created by adding county level random effects to level 2 
coefficients, as well as Smart Start quality enhancement funds as predictors of the level 
2 model terms.  As suggested by model nonconvergence, the data only supported 
inclusion of level 3 random effects for selected level 2 terms.    
Level 1 Model 
yijk = β0ik + β1ik(program typeijk) + β2ik(extended careijk)+ β3ik(program typeijk * extended careijk) + 
β4ik(licensed capacityijk) + β5ik(program typeijk * licensed capacityijk) + β6ik(Head Start fundingijk) 
+ β7ik(More-at-Four fundingijk) + β 8ik(DCD subsidy fundingijk) + rijk 
 
where: 
yijk = total licensing points (or ERS score) of the j
th program within the ith zip code within the kth 
county.  
β0ik = level 1 intercept term for programs within the i
th zip code within the kth county. It also refers 
to the estimated quality of a hypothetical reference program within the ith zip code in the kth 
county – that is a home provider, without extended care, a licensed capacity of 0, and no 
Head Start, More at Four, or DCD subsidy funding.   
βxik = level 1 regression coefficient relating the x
th program characteristic (or intercept) to 
licensing points (or ERS score) within the ith zip code within the kth county.   
rijk = level 1 residual of the j
th program within the ith zip code within the kth county, or the 
deviation of the estimated quality (licensing points or ERS score) for the jth program within 
the ith zip code within the kth county from its predicted value based on the level 1 regression 
model. 
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Overall, the level 1 model describes the prediction of licensing points (or ERS score) of 
individual programs (nested within particular zip codes within particular counties) from program 
level predictors.   
 
Level 2 Model 
β0ik = γ00k + γ01k(disadvantageik) + γ02k(residential stabilityik) + γ03k(affluenceik) + u0ik 
β1ik = γ10k + γ11k(disadvantageik) + u1ik 
β2ik = γ20k  
β3ik = γ30k 
β4ik = γ40k 
β5ik = γ50k 
β6ik = γ60k+ γ 61k(affluenceik) 
β7ik = γ70k + γ 71k(disadvantageik)  
β8ik = γ80k + γ 81k(affluenceik) + u 8ik 
 
where: 
βxik  = level 1 regression coefficient relating the x
th program characteristic (or intercept) to 
licensing points (or ERS score) within the ith zip code within the kth county.   
γ00k = level 2 intercept for predicting the i
th zip code’s intercept value within the kth county.      
γ0zk = the level 2 regression coefficient for predicting the the i
th zip code’s intercept value (within 
the kth county) from the zth zip code characteristic.    
γx0k = level 2 intercept for predicting the coefficient of the x
th program characteristic within the ith 
zip code and kth county.     
γxzk = the level 2 regression coefficient for predicting the coefficient of the x
th program 
characteristic from the zth zip code characteristic in the kth county.  
uxik = conditional level 2 residual associated with the x
th program characteristic for the ith zip code 
nested within the zth county.  It reflects the degree to which there remains substantial zip 
code to zip code variation (within counties) in the relationship between the xth level 1 
program characteristic and program quality (licensing points or ERS score) after taking all 
level 1, level 2, and level 3 terms included in the model into account.   
 
As in the 2-level models, it is assumed that: 
uxik ~ N(0,τxx), or level 2 residuals are normally distributed with a mean of 0 and homogeneous 
variance of τxx. 
Cov(uxik, uzik) = τxzor the covariance between pairs of level 2 residuals = τxz. 
Cov(σiik, uxik) = 0, or level 1 and level 2 residuals are uncorrelated. 
 
Overall, the level 2 model within a three-level hierarchical linear model captures the fixed effects 
of program and zip code level predictors of licensing points (or ERS scores) within counties.  For 
each county, it also captures the heterogeneity remaining between constituent zip codes in values 
of their level 1 parameters for designated terms after taking all predictors in the model into 
account.    
 
Level 3 Model 
γ00k = π000 + π001(quality enhancementk) + δ00k 
γ01k = π010 + π011(quality enhancementk) + δ01k 
γ02k = π020 + π021(quality enhancementk) + δ02k 
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γ03k = π030 + π031(quality enhancementk) + δ03k 
γ10k = π100 + π101(quality enhancementk) + δ10k 
γ11k = π110 + π111(quality enhancementk) + δ11k 
γ20k = π200  
γ30k = π300 
γ40k = π400  
γ50k = π500 
γ60k = π600 + π601(quality enhancementk)  
γ61k = π610 + π611(quality enhancementk)  
γ70k = π700 + π701(quality enhancementk)  
γ 71k = π710 + π711(quality enhancementk)  
γ 80k= π800 + π801(quality enhancementk) + δ80k 
γ 81k = π810 + π811(quality enhancementk) + δ81k 
 
where: 
γ00k = level 2 intercept for predicting the i
th zip code’s intercept value within the kth county.  
π000 = level 3 intercept for predicting zip code-level intercept values.     
π001 = level 3 regression coefficient for predicting zip code-level intercept values from county 
quality improvement funds.     
γ0zk = level 2 regression coefficient for predicting the i
th zip code’s intercept value (within the kth 
county) from the zth zip code characteristic.    
π0z0 = level 3 intercept for predicting zip code-level parameter values on γ0zk .  
π0z1 = level 3 regression coefficient for predicting zip code-level parameter values on γ0zk from 
county quality improvement funds.  
γ xzk = level 2 regression coefficient (or intercept) for predicting the coefficient of the x
th program 
characteristic within the ith zip code and kth county.     
πxz0 = level 3 intercept for predicting zip code-level parameter values on γ xzk .  
πxz1 = level 3 regression coefficient for predicting zip code-level parameter values on γ xzk  from 
county quality improvement funds.  
δxzk = level 3 residual associated with the prediction of a level 2 term (γ00k, γ0zk, γxzk) for the i
th zip 
code within the kth county.  It reflects the degree to which counties still vary in values of the 
level 2 term, even after program, zip code, and county characteristics have been taken into 
account.   
 
It is assumed in 3-level models, that the level 1, level 2, and level 3 covariance structures are 
homogenous within level and that the residual terms are uncorrelated between levels. 
 
After determining the fullest level 3 moderation model supported by the data, the 
model was reduced through a series of stages using model comparisons to determine 
the minimal necessary set of predictors for each level 1 and level 2 coefficient.  As in the 
model reduction process described above for the full 2 level model, all model 
comparisons were guided by Wald tests, but finalized through likelihood ratio tests 
referenced against the full level 3 moderation  model described above.   
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Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model 
In order to better understand which programs requested environment rating 
observations to be conducted, a dummy variable was created to indicate participation (1) 
or nonparticipation (0) in the ERS assessment process. Because the dependent variable 
was dichotomous, a Bernoulli hierarchical generalized linear model (HGLM) utilizing 
Laplace approximation was used based on Raudenbush & Bryk (2002).  The main 
distinction of the HGLM model is that the dependent variable is dichotomous rather than 
continuous as in the previous models. That is, the HGLM method models the log-odds of 
participating or not participating in the ERS observational assessment. Modeling 
procedures began with an unconditional HGLM model followed by an unconditional 1-
level model that included level 1 predictor variables, and a level 2 random effect on the 
intercept. As in the conditional models, theoretically grounded random effects (program 
type, capacity and DCD subsidy funding) were also included in the unconditional 1-level 
model. Except for the level 1 residual, the terms included in the level 1 model are the 
same as in previous examples, so their descriptions will not be reiterated here. In 
Bernoulli HGLMs, the level 1 variance component is determined by probability of the 
event occurring (i.e. participating in the ERS assessment); thus, unless over- or 
underdispersion is present, Bernoulli HGLMs generally do not contain Level 1 residuals.  
The possibility of over- (under-) dispersion was considered, but the data did not support 
it.   
Level 1Model 
Prob(ERS assessment = 1)= φij 
ij = log(φij/1- φij) = β0i + β1i(program typeij) + β2i(extended careij)+ β3i(program typeij * 
extended careij) + β4i(licensed capacityij) + β5i(program typeij * licensed capacityij) + β6i(Head 
Start fundingij) + β7i(More-at-Four fundingij) + β8i(DCD subsidy fundingij) 
 
Level 2 Model 
β0i = γ00 + u0i 
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β1i = γ10 + u1i 
β2i = γ20  
β3i = γ30  
β4i = γ40 + u4i 
β5i = γ50  
β6i = γ60  
β7i = γ70  
β8i = γ80 + u8i 
 
Additional assumptions of the HGLM model includes: 
μxi ~ N (0,τxx), or level 2 residuals are normally distributed with a mean of 0 and homogeneous 
variance of τxx. 
Cov(μxi, μzi) = τxzor the covariance between pairs of level 2 residuals = τxz. 
 
This model was reduced based on the same procedure used with the conditional 
models, eliminating non-significant random effects tested against the full level 1 model 
with likelihood ratio tests based on deviance statistics. Level 2 predictors were added to 
the level-1 effective model to create a full 2-level model as in the example below (refer to 
the previous full 2-level HLM model for a more extended description of each term). 
Level 1Model 
Prob(ERS assessment =1)= φ 
ij = log(φij/1- φij) = β0i + β1i(program typeij) + β2i(extended careij)+ β3i(program typeij * 
extended careij) + β4i(licensed capacityij) + β5i(program typeij * licensed capacityij) + β6i(Head 
Start fundingij) + β7i(More-at-Four fundingij) + β8i(DCD subsidy fundingij) 
 
Level 2 Model 
β0i = γ00 + γ01(disadvantagei) +  γ02(immigrationi) +  γ03(residential stabilityi) +  γ04(affluencei) +  
u0i 
β1i = γ10 + γ11(disadvantagei) +  γ12(immigrationi) +  γ13(residential stabilityi) +  γ14(affluencei) +  
u1i 
β2i = γ20 + γ21(disadvantagei) +  γ22(immigrationi) +  γ23(residential stabilityi) +  γ24(affluencei)  
β3i = γ30  
β4i = γ40  
β5i = γ50  
β6i = γ60 + γ61(disadvantagei) +  γ62(immigrationi) +  γ63(residential stabilityi) +  γ6 (affluencei)  
β7i = γ70 + γ71(disadvantagei) +  γ72(immigrationi) +  γ73(residential stabilityi) +  γ74(affluencei)  
β8i = γ80 + γ81(disadvantagei) +  γ82(immigrationi) +  γ83(residential stabilityi) +  γ84(affluencei)  
 
Additional assumptions are the same as for the unconditional level 1 HGLM described above. 
 
The full 2-level model was reduced using the same procedures previously 
described for the 2-level conditional models. Using the 2-level effective model as the 
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foundation model for adding Smart Start quality enhancement funds at the third level as 
a possible moderator of the 2-level effects. The 3-level model was reduced to identify an 
effective model using the same procedures previously described for 3-level models of 
program quality.   
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CHAPTER VII 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
 First, results from 2- and 3-level models with the full sample (n = 6882) and 
licensing points as the outcome variable are reported. Second, results from an HGLM 
model describing predictors associated with participation in the voluntary ERS 
observational assessment are reported. The sub-sample, that voluntarily participated in 
the ERS observational assessment (n = 2964), is further analyzed with a 3-level model 
(with licensing points as the outcome variable) compared to the full sample. Finally, 
results from 2- and 3-level models from the sub-sample and ERS scores as the outcome 
variable are reported.   
Full Sample 
Unconditional 
The two-level model with licensing points as the outcome variable at level 1 and 
programs nested within zip codes (σ2 =  20.61, τ00 = 1.28) accounted for more variance 
(6%) compared to when programs were nested  within Smart Start county boundaries 
(σ2 =  20.89, τ00 = 0.84; 4%). Furthermore, there is more homogeneity at the zip code 
level indicating that the quality of programs can better be predicted when they are closer 
in proximity (e.g. within the same zip code compared to within the same county). These 
results support the theoretical argument for examining child care quality within the 
geographic level of zip codes in 2-level conditional models. Additionally, there is 
substantial variability in child care quality between zip codes and counties. That is, 
quality varies by zip code and by county.  
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Conditional 2-Level Model 
Modeling procedures began by identifying an effective level 1 model. 
Heterogeneity was predicted by center type and, as reported in table 4, the best fitting or 
most parsimonious level 1 model resulted by retaining random effects for the intercept 
(u0i), program type (u1i), and DCD subsidy funding (u8i) while dropping the random effect 
for licensed capacity (u4i). In the level 1 effective model, the level 1 covariates (program 
type, extended care, capacity, the interaction of program type with extended care, the 
interaction of program type with capacity, Head Start funding, More-at-Four funding, and 
DCD subsidy funding) helped to explain 22% of the variance (pseudo R2 = 0.22). The 
level 1 effective model was the foundation for adding level 2 (zip code level) predictor 
variables in a full model including: concentrated disadvantage, concentrated 
immigration, residential stability, and concentrated affluence. In the reduced model 
concentrated immigration was not a main effect nor was it involved in an interaction 
therefore it was eliminated from the model in the final effective 2-level model.  
Program Level 
As depicted in Figure 1, the interaction of program type and extended care (γ30 = 
-1.37, p ≤ .00) was a level 1 main effect where family child care homes offering second 
and/or third shift care received a boost in predicted licensing points while centers 
offering extended care received a decrement in predicted licensing points. It was 
hypothesized (H2c) that extended care would be negatively related to child care quality. 
This hypothesis was partially supported in the case of center care but, not supported 
with family child care homes.  
At level 1, the interaction between licensed capacity and program type (γ50 = -
3.41, p ≤ .00) indicated that family child care homes with higher capacities received an 
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increment in predicted licensing points whereas centers with higher capacities received 
a decrement in predicted licensing points (see Figure 2). It was hypothesized (H2b) that 
capacity would be negatively related to quality. This hypothesis was partially supported 
with centers with higher capacities gaining fewer predicted licensing points; however, 
larger family child care homes earned more predicted points.  
Community Level 
At level 2, residential stability was a main effect and negatively related to 
predicted licensing points (γ02 = -3.12, p ≤ .00). In contrast with the hypothesis (H4c), 
communities with higher rates of residential stability had lower predicted licensing points.  
Program and Community Level Interactions 
Furthermore, level 1 and 2 interactions included program type with concentrated 
affluence (γ11 = -3.46, p ≤ .015), Head Start funding with concentrated affluence (γ61 = -
1.05, p ≤ .00), More-at-Four funding with concentrated disadvantage (γ71 = -1.19, p ≤ 
.00), and DCD subsidy funding with concentrated affluence (γ81 = -0.69, p ≤ .00). As 
hypothesized (H4d and H2a), both centers and family child homes improved in predicted 
licensing points as communities were more affluent with centers consistently earning 
more predicted licensing points compared to family child care homes (see Figure 3). The 
interaction between concentrated affluence and Head Start funds indicated that as Head 
Start funds increased, predicted licensing points improved across levels of concentrated 
affluence (supporting hypothesis H3b) with the greatest boost in communities of lower 
concentrated affluence (see Figure 4). That is, Head Start funds had the greatest impact 
in communities with less concentrated affluence. As hypothesized (H3a), More-at-Four 
funds were also related to higher predicted licensing points in programs. However, the 
relationship was greatest in communities with less concentrated disadvantage (see 
59 
 
Figure 5). That is, the boost in quality received from More-at-Four dollars had less of an 
impact in communities of higher concentrated disadvantage. It was hypothesized (H3c) 
that DCD subsidy funds would be negatively related to child care quality. This hypothesis 
was not supported. Results suggest a positive relationship between DCD subsidy funds 
and predicted licensing points. More specifically, in the interaction between DCD subsidy 
funds and concentrated affluence, DCD funds equalize the relationship between 
concentrated affluence and predicted licensing points. That is, at the highest level of 
DCD subsidy funds, programs across all levels of concentrated affluence receive the 
same boost in predicted licensing points (see Figure 6). However, when DCD subsidy 
funds are low, programs in communities with higher levels of concentrated affluence 
receive a greater boost in predicted licensing points compared to programs in 
communities with lower levels of concentrated affluence.  
Conditional 3-Level Model 
The foundation of the full-sample 3-level model was the effective full-sample 2-
level model (see Table 5). The only random effect that was needed at level 3 was the 
intercept. Additionally, at level 2 in the 3-level model, the random effect for DCD subsidy 
funding was no longer needed. The full 3-level model, accounting for Smart Start quality 
enhancement funds, is noted in Table 5. Furthermore, as hypothesized (H5b), in the final 
effective 3-level model there were significant changes in the results compared to the 2-
level model.  
Distinctions between the 2- and 3- Level Models 
Smart Start quality enhancement funds interacted with residential stability (γ021 = 
-1.59, p ≤ 0.01) and concentrated affluence (γ030 = -1.80, p ≤ 0.00) in the 3-level model. 
In the interaction with residential stability, as depicted in Figure 7, Smart Start quality 
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enhancement funds are positively related to predicted licensing points (hypothesis H5a) 
and yield the greatest impact in communities with less residential stability. Additionally, 
Smart Start quality enhancement funds interacted with concentrated affluence. As 
illustrated in Figure 8, Smart Start quality enhancement funds were positively related to 
predicted licensing points (hypothesis H5a) across all levels of concentrated affluence 
yielding the most points in communities with the highest levels of concentrated affluence; 
however, the funds had the greatest impact (i.e. the steepest slope) in communities with 
the lowest concentrated affluence.  
In the 3-level model there was still an interaction between Head Start funds and 
concentrated affluence (γ610 = -1.12, p ≤ 0.01); however, when accounting for Smart 
Start quality enhancement funds, the relationship changed. That is, Head Start funds 
continued to improve predicted licensing points but, the greatest boost was in 
communities of higher concentrated affluence (see Figure 9). 
In the 3-level model, Smart Start quality enhancement funds interacted with DCD 
subsidy funds to affect predicted licensing points (γ801 = 0.04, p ≤ 0.057). In this 
interaction DCD subsidy funds and Smart Start quality enhancement funds worked 
together to yield the greatest boost in quality, with programs receiving the most DCD 
subsidy funds and Smart Start quality enhancement funds yielding the highest predicted 
licensing points, and programs receiving the least funds from DCD and Smart Start 
yielding the lowest predicted licensing points (see Figure 10). 
As in the 2-level model, DCD subsidy funds interacted with concentrated 
affluence in the 3-level model (γ810 = -0.86, p ≤ 0.00); however, when accounting for 
Smart Start quality enhancement funds, the relationship with licensing points changed. 
In the 3-level model, concentrated affluence was positively related to quality with 
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programs in the most affluent communities yielding the greatest boost in predicted 
licensing points; however as subsidy funds increased the boost became smaller (with 
the exception of programs in communities with 0% affluence in which they maintained 
the same level of quality across subsidy levels, see Figure 11). That is, as DCD subsidy 
funds increased the boost in predicted licensing points associated with concentrated 
affluence decreased with the greatest drop in communities of highest concentrated 
affluence.  
Similar Program Level Results 
Consistent with the level 2 model, there was an interaction between program 
type and extended care (γ300 = -1.42, p ≤ 0.00), and an interaction between licensed 
capacity and program type (γ500 = -3.30, p ≤ 0.00). As in the 2-level model, centers 
offering extended care received a decrement in predicted licensing points whereas 
family child care homes offering extended care received a boost in predicted licensing 
points (see Figure 12). Additionally, as represented in figure 13, family child care homes 
with higher capacities received an increment in predicted licensing points and centers 
with higher capacities received a small decrement in predicted licensing points.  
Similar Program and Community Level Interactions 
In an interaction between concentrated affluence and program type (γ110 = 3.14, p 
≤ 0.05), predicted licensing points increased as concentrated affluence increased with 
centers receiving the greatest boost compared to family child care homes (see Figure 
14). In an interaction between concentrated disadvantage and More-at-Four funds (γ710 
= -1.10, p ≤ 0.02), More-at-Four funds were positively related to predicted licensing 
points and the greatest boost was among programs nested in communities with less 
concentrated disadvantage (see Figure 15).  
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Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models 
As previously described, the program standards component of the rated license 
includes a voluntary observational ERS assessment. Per research question 6, it was of 
interest to understand program and community level characteristics that may predict 
participation.  
Program Level  
In the effective HGLM 2-level model (see Table 6) there was an interaction 
between program type and extended care (γ30 = -0.43, p ≤ 0.00; odds ratio = 0.65) and 
program type and capacity (γ50 = -0.67, p ≤ 0.03; odds ratio = 0.51) in predicting the log-
odds of participation in the ERS observational assessment. As depicted in Figure 16, 
centers were more likely to participate in the ERS assessment compared to family child 
care homes. Furthermore, centers without extended care were slightly less likely to 
participate compared to centers with extended care. In contrast, family child care homes 
with extended care were slightly more likely to participate than family child care homes 
without extended care. Both family child care homes and centers with higher capacity 
were more likely to participate in the ERS assessment, with the greatest impact among 
family child care homes (see Figure 17). Additionally, programs receiving More-at-Four 
funds were 1.4 times more likely to participate in an assessment compared to programs 
that did not receive More-at-Four funds (γ70 = 0.33, p ≤ 0.00). 
Community Level  
 Concentrated disadvantage (γ031 = -2.64, p ≤ 0.01) and residential stability (γ03 = -
1.87, p ≤ 0.01) were main effects in predicting the log-odds of participation in the ERS 
observational assessment. Programs in communities with less concentrated 
disadvantage were 0.07 times more likely to participate in an ERS assessment and 
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programs with less residential stability were 0.15 times more likely to participate in an 
ERS assessment. 
Program and Community Level  
Head Start funds interacted with concentrated immigration (γ61 = -1.58, p ≤ 0.02; 
odds ratio = 0.21) and DCD subsidy funds interacted with concentrated affluence (γ82 = -
0.37, p ≤ 0.00; odds ratio = 0.69) in predicting the log-odds of participation in an ERS 
observational assessment. As illustrated in Figure 18 Head Starts funds were positively 
related to participation; however, as concentrated immigration increased, the likelihood 
of participation decreased. The 2-way interaction between DCD subsidy funds and 
concentrated affluence suggested that, as both concentrated affluence and DCD subsidy 
funding increased, the likelihood of participation in the ERS assessment also increased. 
Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 19, DCD subsidy funding narrowed the gap in the 
relationship between concentrated affluence and participation. DCD subsidy funds also 
marginally interacted with concentrated immigration (γ81 = 0.51, p ≤ 0.07; odds ratio = 
1.67). The marginal interaction between DCD subsidy funding and concentrated 
immigration suggested that programs with DCD subsidy funding increased the likelihood 
of participation (see Figure 20); however as concentrated immigration increased 
programs with no or low levels (25th percentile) of DCD subsidy funding were less likely 
to participate in an assessment. In contrast, when programs with moderate (50th 
percentile) to high (75th percentile) levels of DCD subsidy programs were in communities 
of higher concentrated immigration they were slightly more likely to participate in the 
assessment.  
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HGLM 3-Level Model 
The effective 2-level HGLM model was the foundation for adding Smart Start 
quality enhancement funds at the third level (see Table 7). Smart Start quality 
enhancements funds were not found to be significant as a main effect or interaction. In 
the reduced model the main effect of Smart Start quality enhancement funds remained 
non-significant. Therefore, Smart Start quality enhancement funds did not help to predict 
the likelihood of participation in the ERS observational assessment. 
Sub-Sample of Programs Participating in Voluntary Assessment 
Unconditional 
A 2-level unconditional model was tested with the sub-sample using licensing 
points and ERS scores as the outcome variables at level 1. With the outcome variable 
licensing points, programs nested within zip codes (σ2 =  5.99, τ00 = 0.29) accounted for 
the same amount of variance (5%) compared to nesting programs within counties (σ2 =  
6.02, τ00 = 0.35; 5%). With the ERS score as the outcome variable, programs nested 
within zip codes (σ2 = 0.33, τ00 = 0.03) accounted for the same amount of variance (8%) 
compared to when programs were nested within counties (σ2 =  0.33, τ00 = 0.03; 8%). 
Furthermore, total points and program ERS scores for the sub-sample varied between 
zip codes and between counties. To be consistent with the full sample, programs were 
nested within the socioeconomic contexts of zip codes and county level Smart Start 
quality enhancement funding for the 2- and 3-level conditional models, respectively.  
Sub-Sample Conditional 3-Level with Licensing Points 
 Analyses with the sub-sample began by building a 3-level model comparable to 
the full sample by using licensing points as the outcome variable. The level 1 effective 
model included random effects for the intercept (u0) and for licensed capacity (u4; see 
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table 7). The full level 2 (see Table 4) and the full level 3 (see Table 5) models for the 
full-sample were duplicated for a full 3-level model for the sub-sample. The 3-level 
effective model of the full-sample was also duplicated with the sub-sample and tested 
against the 3-level full model created for the subsample (as previously described) with 
Wald tests and likelihood ratio tests on deviance statistics. Model comparisons 
confirmed that the 3-level model for the sub-sample could be reduced (see Table 8) to 
the full-sample effective model. However, the sub-sample significance tests suggested 
that further reduction was needed. The highest order interactions (quality enhancement 
funds with concentrated affluence, G031; quality enhancement funds with DCD funds, 
G801) that were not significant were first dropped from the model individually followed by 
lower order interactions (concentrated affluence with Head Start funds, G610; 
concentrated disadvantage with More-at-Four funds, G710; and concentrated affluence 
with DCD funds, G810).  
Program Level 
 In the subsample, there was a similar interaction between program type and 
extended care (γ300 = -0.63, p ≤ 0.03) that was found with the full sample. Overall, 
centers received more predicted licensing points compared to family child care homes 
(supporting H2a). However, when centers offered extended care their advantage 
dropped slightly compared to centers that did not offer extended care (see Figure 21). In 
contrast, when family child care homes offered extend care they received slightly higher 
predicted licensing points compared to family child care homes that did not offer 
extended care (partially supporting H2c).  There was also an interaction between 
program type and licensed capacity (γ500 = -1.77, p ≤ 0.00) which was similar to the full 
sample results (partially supporting H2b). That is, centers with larger capacities received 
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a decrement in predicted licensing points while family child care homes with larger 
capacities received an increment in predicted licensing points (see Figure 22). 
Furthermore, Head Start (γ600 = 0.07, p ≤ 0.00) and More-at-Four (γ700 = 0.22, p ≤ 0.00) 
funds were positively related to predicted licensing points (supporting H3a and H3b); 
while DCD subsidy funds (γ800 = -0.10, p ≤ 0.00) were negatively related to predicted 
licensing points (supporting H3c). Unlike the full sample results, Head Start, More-at-
Four, and DCD funds were main effects. They did not interact with contextual variables 
in the subsample.  
Community Level 
 Concentrated disadvantage was negatively related to predicted licensing points 
in the subsample (γ010 = -2.58, p ≤ 0.01). This was a unique main effect for the 
subsample and supported hypothesis H4a.  
Program and Community Level  
As in the full sample, program type and concentrated affluence interacted in the 
subsample (γ110 = 1.80, p ≤ 0.05); however, the interaction yielded different results. In 
the subsample, centers received higher predicted licensing points compared to family 
child care homes (supporting H2a). Furthermore, centers in more affluent areas received 
a small boost in predicted licensing points compared to centers in less affluent areas 
while family child care homes received a very slight decrement in predicted licensing 
points when in higher affluent areas (see Figure 23). Compared to Figure 14 (for the full 
sample), the increase in predicted licensing points attributed to concentrated affluence 
for centers was less in the subsample than the full sample.   
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Zip Code and County Level Interaction 
As in the full sample, residential stability interacted with Smart Start quality 
enhancement funds (γ021 = -1.07, p ≤ 0.03). In both the full and subsample, when Smart 
Start quality enhancement funds were at their minimum, more predicted licensing points 
were attributed to higher levels of residential stability (supporting H4c). In the 
subsample, as residential stability increased to the 25th percentile (53%), quality 
enhancement funds continued to provide a boost in predicted licensing points, although 
a smaller boost compared to lower levels of residential stability (see Figure 24). In 
contrast, as residential stability increased to the 50th percentile of the sample (61%), 
Smart Start funds had even less of an effect. Distinct from the effect in the full sample 
(see Figure 7), the effect in the subsample dropped below the boost attributed to less 
residential stability alone (based on the minimum value of Smart Start quality 
enhancement funds in Figure 24). That is, as residential stability increased, Smart Start 
quality enhancement funds had less of an effect in improving predicted licensing points. 
Conditional 2-Level Model with ERS Scores 
The same process that was conducted with the full-sample was followed with the 
sub-sample using the ERS scores as the outcome variable. The test of homogeneity of 
the level 1 variance in the model was not significant therefore, homogeneity could be 
assumed. The most parsimonious level 1 model resulted by retaining random effects for 
the intercept (u0) and program type (u1) which became the level 1 effective model (see 
table 5). The level 1 effective model was the foundation for adding the level 2 (zip code) 
main effects and interactions. Furthermore, the level 1 interaction between program type 
and extended care was not needed in the 2-level model and therefore was eliminated 
from the model to create the effective 2-level model (see table 9).  
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Program Level 
At the program level, there was an interaction between licensed capacity and 
program type (γ40 = -0.29, p ≤ .01). As in the model with licensing points hypothesis H2a 
and H2b were partially supported (see Figure 25). Family child care homes with higher 
capacities received higher predicted ERS scores compared to family child care homes 
with lower capacities. In contrast, centers with higher capacities received lower predicted 
ERS scores compared to centers with lower capacities. Furthermore, as hypothesized 
(H3a and H3c), More-at-Four funds were positively related to predicted ERS scores (γ60 
= 0.03, p ≤ .00) and DCD subsidy funds were negatively related to predicted ERS scores 
(γ70 = -0.03, p ≤ .00).  
Program and Community Level Interactions 
Level 1 and 2 interactions included program type with concentrated immigration 
(γ11 = 1.39, p ≤ .02), and extended care with concentrated disadvantage (γ21 = 0.80, p ≤ 
.04). It was hypothesized that concentrated immigration would be negatively related to 
quality (H4b). This hypothesis was partially supported (see Figure 26). Family child care 
homes in communities with higher levels of concentrated immigration experienced a 
decrement in predicted ERS scores. In contrast, centers in communities with higher 
levels of concentrated immigration received a boost in predicted ERS scores. Overall, 
extended care was related to lower predicted ERS scores (as hypothesized in H2c). 
However, as the level of concentrated disadvantage increased to the 75th percentile 
(17%) in communities, the negative effect of extended care was equalized (see Figure 
27). That is, programs with and without extended care in the most disadvantaged 
communities received similarly low scores on predicted ERS scores whereas in 
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communities with less concentrated disadvantaged programs not offering extended care 
received a smaller decrement in predicted ERS scores.  
Head Start funds interacted with all four community level predictors of 
concentrated disadvantage (γ51 = -0.21, p ≤ .01), concentrated immigration (γ52 = -0.31, p 
≤ .01), residential stability (γ53 = -0.22, p ≤ .00), and concentrated affluence (γ54 = -0.15, p 
≤ .01).  Among all four interactions, as Head Start funds increased, predicted ERS 
scores increased (supporting hypothesis H3b); however, predicted ERS scores 
differentially increased depending on the context of the communities in which they were 
nested. For example, programs receiving Head Start funds received a greater increment 
in predicted ERS scores when they were in communities with less concentrated 
disadvantage (see Figure 28). That is, in communities with higher levels of concentrated 
disadvantage Head Start funds had less of an impact on predicted ERS scores. 
Similarly, the impact of Head Start funds was not as large in communities with higher 
levels of concentrated immigration (see Figure 29). Head Start funds had the most 
impact on predicted ERS scores in communities where there was less residential 
stability (see Figure 30). Programs receiving Head Start funds received a greater boost 
on predicted ERS scores when they were in communities of lower concentrated 
affluence (see Figure 31).  
Sub-Sample 3-Level with ERS Scores  
A 3-level model, accounting for Smart Start quality enhancement funds, was also 
tested with the sub-sample and the ERS scores as the outcome variable. The 2-level 
effective model (see Table 9) was used as the foundation for the 3-level model. As 
described in chapter 6 (analytic strategy), at level 3 (county level), a full model was 
created by adding appropriate random effects and Smart Start quality enhancement 
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funds as a main effect and as a possible interaction with level 1 and 2 variables. 
However, the data were not strong enough to support all of the random effects. 
Therefore, the random effects were reduced to the intercept and program type based on 
the results of the 2-level effective model. This model became the reduced full model (see 
Table 10). From here, model reduction adhered to the original protocol, dropping non-
significant 3-way interactions individually followed by non-significant 2-way interactions 
(involving Smart Start quality enhancement funds) to achieve a final 3-level effective 
model.  Furthermore, as hypothesized (H5b), Smart Start quality enhancement funds 
had a moderating effect on the 2-level effective model.   
Distinctions between the 2- and 3- Level Models 
In the 3-level model, Smart Start quality enhancement funds interacted with 
program type and concentrated immigration in a 3-way interaction (γ111 = -1.05, p ≤ .01). 
For both family child care homes and centers Smart Start quality enhancement funds 
were associated with lower predicted ERS scores (see Figures 32a and 32b). That is, 
the higher the county level quality enhancement funds, the lower the predicted ERS 
scores. However, as concentrated immigration increased, the decrement became 
smaller for family child care homes (see Figure 32a). In contrast, the decrement 
remained relatively consistent for centers across levels of concentrated immigration 
except for programs in counties receiving the lowest amount of quality enhancement 
funds (see Figure 32b). In these counties, the decrement was slightly less as 
concentrated immigration increased.  
Quality enhancement funds were also involved in a 3-way interaction with 
extended care and concentrated disadvantage (γ111 = -0.67, p ≤ .04). For programs not 
offering extended care, programs in zip codes with the highest level of concentrated 
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disadvantage and within counties receiving the lowest amounts of Smart Start quality 
enhancement funds yielded the greatest effect (see Figure 33a). In contrast, programs 
that offered extended care seemed to perform more similarly across levels of 
concentrated disadvantage (see Figure 33b). With the exception of programs in counties 
receiving the fewest quality enhancement funds, programs offering extended care 
demonstrated relatively similar predicted ERS scores across levels of concentrated 
disadvantage and quality enhancement funds.   
Similar Program Level Results 
The interaction between program type and licensed capacity demonstrated a 
similar pattern in both the 2- and 3-level models with centers receiving a decrement in 
predicted ERS scores as capacity increased and family child care homes receiving an 
increment in predicted ERS scores as capacity increased (see Figure 34). However, the 
relationship with predicted ERS scores is only marginally significant in the 3-level model 
(γ400 = -0.21, p ≤ .06).   
In the 3-level model More-at-Four funds maintained a significant positive 
relationship with predicted ERS scores (γ600= 0.03, p ≤ .00) and DCD subsidy funds 
maintained a significant negative relationship with predicted ERS scores (γ700= -0.03, p ≤ 
.00).  
Similar Program and Community Interactions 
In the 3-level model Head Start funds interacted with all four community level 
characteristics (concentrated disadvantage, γ510= -0.13, p ≤ .09; concentrated 
immigration, γ520= -0.24, p ≤ .03; residential stability, γ530= -0.18, p ≤ .01; and 
concentrated affluence, γ540= -0.15, p ≤ .01). In the interaction between Head Start funds 
and concentrated disadvantage, predicted ERS scores dropped as concentrated 
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disadvantage increased. This drop was smallest for the programs receiving the most 
Head Start funds (see Figure 35). While the pattern in the 3-level model was similar to 
that in the 2-level model, it was only marginally significant in the 3-level model. In the 
interaction between Head Start funds and concentrated immigration an increment in 
predicted ERS scores associated with Head Start funds decreased as concentrated 
immigration increased (see Figure 36). A similar pattern is again depicted in the 
interaction between Head Start funds and residential stability (see Figure 37). As 
residential stability increased, the increment in predicted quality associated with Head 
Start funds was compromised. Finally, in the interaction between Head Start funds and 
concentrated affluence, the boost in predicted quality associated with Head Start funds 
was greatest in communities with the least concentrated affluence (see Figure 38). 
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CHAPTER VIII 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
The purpose of the current study was to examine how socioeconomics of 
community contexts shape access to high quality child care in North Carolina. By 
combining multiple state-wide data sources, program and community level 
characteristics were combined to better understand predictors of child care quality. 
Including nearly all licensed child care programs in the sample increased the validity and 
generalizability of the results. Furthermore, more homogeneity was found at the zip code 
level indicating that the quality of programs can better be predicted when they are closer 
in proximity (e.g. within the same zip code compared to within the same county). 
Funding sources at the program and community levels, as well as the socioeconomic 
status of the communities in which programs resided, proved to matter in predicting child 
care quality. Results support the bioecological theory (Bronfenbrenner & Evans 2000) 
that human processes are situated within micro and macro-level contexts that interact 
dynamically.   
The current study demonstrates that there are inequities within the system where 
the highest quality child care is differentially accessible based on program level 
characteristics, community socioeconomics, and interactions among the program and 
community variables. Because of the dynamic nature of the models it is overly simplistic 
to separate effects. However, for purposes of organization, the following discussion is 
divided into five main sections. The first section focuses on the community context, 
followed by a focus on program level characteristics, and finally a section that discusses 
74 
 
program level and community level funding. Interactions are included in the sections 
where they seemed most logical. Therefore, some program characteristics are 
discussed in tandem with effects about the community context in the section focusing on 
community context and vice versa. Next, selection effects of the programs participating 
in the ERS component of the rated license are discussed. Study limitations and future 
research suggestions are discussed followed by policy recommendations. 
Community Context 
In an interaction with program type, concentrated affluence was positively related 
to predicted quality as defined by licensing points in both the 2- and 3-level models for 
the full sample. Both family child care homes and centers were of higher quality in 
communities with greater concentrated affluence. Communities with higher levels of 
concentrated affluence include the greatest percentage of families earning $75,000 or 
higher, that are college educated, and employed in professional or managerial 
occupations. In communities where these characteristics were less prevalent – 
especially in communities where residents have lower incomes, are less educated, and 
engage in low-wage work – child care programs were of lower predicted quality.  
These results clearly indicate a positive correlation between zip code level 
concentrated affluence and predicted child care quality. One explanation for this result is 
that families that are college educated and earn higher incomes may seek out and 
create more demand for higher quality programs. Programs in more affluent areas may 
also be able to charge higher fees and therefore provide higher quality care that is more 
expensive to implement. It also may be easier to recruit and hire more educated 
teachers in these communities. Likely it is a combination of factors that are at play. 
Peyton, Jacobs, O’Brien, & Roy (2001) found families of higher incomes to be more 
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likely to choose child care based on quality (of the teachers, environment, and program) 
rather than practicality (fees, hours, location, and availability). Furthermore, the children 
of parents that chose child care based on quality were more likely to be in higher quality 
programs and be more satisfied with the care their children were receiving compared to 
the children whose parents, who were more likely to have lower incomes, chose their 
child care based on practicality.  In the current study, in community contexts of higher 
concentrated affluence, programs were able to meet the higher licensing standards in 
order to obtain greater licensing points a proxy for higher quality early learning 
experiences for the children accessing those programs compared to their counterparts in 
communities with less concentrated affluence.    
 In the subsample (the programs that participated in the ERS assessment) 3-
level model with licensing points as the outcome, programs received higher predicted 
licensing points when they were in communities with less concentrated disadvantage. 
The concentrated disadvantage scale was made up of percent below the poverty line, 
percent receiving public assistance, percent unemployed, percent female-headed 
families with children, and percent Black or African American. Additionally, concentrated 
disadvantage was negatively correlated with percent White or European American. 
Therefore, the highest quality programs in the subsample (or the programs earning the 
highest program score on the ERS assessments) were more likely to be located in 
communities with a higher percentage of White people in addition to a lower percentage 
of families below the poverty line, receiving public assistance, unemployed, single 
mothers, and Black or African American.  Past research has found that African American 
children tend to be in lower quality child care compared to their European American 
peers (Cassidy, Lower, Kintner, & Hestenes, 2009; Howes, Sakai, Shinn, Phillips, 
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Galinsky, & Whitebook, 1995; Kontos, 1997; LoCasale-Crouch, et al., 2007). Based on 
the current study, one plausible reason for this is that the highest quality child care is not 
accessible in the communities in which the majority of African American families reside. 
Furthermore, in the subsample – with a restricted range of child care quality that 
represents the higher quality programs in the state – programs in communities of less 
concentrated disadvantage are fairing best. One could argue that these programs are 
the best of the best and they are the least likely to be in communities that may need 
them most.  
Based on past research, children from contexts that were less affluent and more 
disadvantaged are likely to benefit the most from high quality child care (Peisner-
Feinberg, Burchinal, Clifford, Culkin, Howes, Kagan, & Yazejian, 2001; Caughy, 
Daughtry, DiPietro, & Stobino, 1994; Connell & Prinz, 2002; Magnuson, Meyers, Ruhm, 
& Waldfogel, 2004). That is, the impact of high quality child care on children’s 
developmental outcomes (cognitive and social) is greatest for children with risk factors 
associated with living in and near poverty. Investing early in children with the most need 
has been found to have long term positive effects for later academic, social, and 
economic productivity into adulthood (Cunha & Heckman, 2006; Duncan, Ludwig, & 
Magnuson, 2007; Heckman, 2010).  However, in the current study these were the 
programs that were least likely to be in communities where families most at risk resided. 
In the communities with low rates of concentrated affluence and high rates of 
concentrated disadvantage, the local child care programs were most likely to be of lower 
predicted quality. Although the current study is not able to confirm that families utilized 
the child care programs within the zip code in which they lived, families rate location as 
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important (Kim & Fram, 2009) and often choose child care based on location (Peyton, 
Jacobs, O’Brien, & Roy, 2001).  
While it is established that high quality child care is related to positive 
developmental outcomes especially among children in and near poverty, research has 
found poor and near poor children to experience lower quality care (Kontos, 1997; 
Phillips, Voran, Kisker, Howes, & Whitebook, 1994). Furthermore, there is evidence the 
developmental outcomes of children experiencing the stresses associated with poverty 
at home and experiencing compromised levels of quality in child care, are cumulatively 
inhibited (Hooper, Burchinal, Roberts, Zeisel, and Neebe, 1998). Although the current 
study is not able to confirm the home addresses of the children in the programs, it is 
likely that families living with less affluence and more disadvantage are least likely to 
make long commutes in search of higher quality care. Peyton, Jacobs, O’Brien, & Roy 
(2001) found families with low incomes to be nearly 4 times more likely to choose child 
care based on practical reasons including location compared to their higher income 
counterparts. Certainly with the known importance of high quality early care and 
education for children in poverty, efforts should be made to make high quality programs 
easily accessible in the communities where children and families in need reside.  
Also important to note is that concentrated disadvantage was negatively 
correlated with the percentage of White population. Therefore, the highest quality 
programs in the restricted sample (of already higher quality programs compared to the 
full sample) are most likely to be in communities with a higher concentration of White 
people and the lowest concentration of Black or African American people. Past research 
has found African American children to be in lower quality programs (Cassidy, Lower, 
Kintner, & Hestenes, 2009; Howes, Sakai, Shinn, Phillips, Galinsky, & Whitebook, 1995). 
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The current study confirms that the highest quality programs are least likely to be in the 
communities where African American children live. 
Another contextual variable that was related to child care quality was residential 
stability. Counter to our hypothesis, in the full sample 2-level model, lower rates of 
residential stability were associated with higher licensing points. In the full sample 3-level 
model residential stability interacted with Smart Start quality enhancement funds where 
quality enhancement funds yielded the greatest boost in licensing points when in 
communities of less residential stability. Residential stability was comprised of percent of 
residents who resided in the same house for at least five years and the percent of 
owner-occupied homes. Because higher rates of residential stability tend to be 
associated with more positive community and individual outcomes (Sampson, Morenoff, 
& Gannon-Rowley, 2002), it was hypothesized that more residential stability would be 
positively related to child care quality.  
However, based on the results of the full sample, it seems that some transiency 
in communities is positive for child care quality. It may be that families living in the same 
house for less than five years are younger and have younger children. Additionally, 
communities with less transiency – higher percentage of residents living in the same 
house for greater than five years and own their home – may be more likely to be older, 
have older children, or be retired and not in need of early care and education. This was 
found in a study of child care supply in Massachusetts where greater residential stability 
was related to lower proportions of children birth to 5 relative to retirees ages 55-74 
(Queralt and Witte, 1998). Additionally, Queralt and Witte suggest in communities where 
residents are more stable, neighbors may be more willing to care for children in their 
home. With less than 1% of unregulated care in North Carolina, neighbors operating 
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family child care homes (of lower quality compared to centers) in order to legally care for 
children in their communities of higher residential stability is a plausible explanation.  
In contrast, residential stability did not have the same impact in the subsample 
with the restricted data, including only programs with the ERS assessment. In the 3-level 
model, with licensing points as the outcome, residential stability interacted with Smart 
Start quality enhancement funds. In this interaction more predicted licensing points were 
related to higher levels of residential stability. Therefore, of the higher quality programs 
participating in the ERS assessment, residential stability seemed to have a qualitatively 
different impact. Important to note, in the restricted sample 36% of the programs were 
family child care homes compared to 54% in the full sample. Furthermore, in the full 
sample 17% of family child care homes and 22% of centers had 4 or 5 stars. In 
comparison, in the restricted sample 30% of the family child care homes and 50% of the 
centers were 4 or 5 star programs. With a greater percentage of the sample representing 
higher quality programs, there seems to be a unique effect associated with residential 
stability that characterizes this variable in a different way. In other words, the highest 
quality programs, where ERS assessments were completed, were located in more stable 
communities (with a higher rate of residents living in the same house for at least five 
year and a higher rate of home ownership). This is likely a selection effect, a function of 
the restricted sample. For example, based on the results from Queralt and Witte (1998), 
perhaps in the restricted sample, rather than greater stability being related to a lower 
concentration of young children relative to retirees, perhaps greater residential stability 
was related to a higher concentration of young children.  
 
 
80 
 
Program Type 
Child care centers and family child care homes functioned differentially in the 
North Carolina system. Consistently, child care centers outperformed family child care 
homes in both predicted licensing points and ERS scores. Furthermore, program type 
interacted with other program level and contextual variables (as previously described) 
suggesting centers and family child care homes uniquely operate within the QRIS 
system and their community contexts. This contention is supported by recent research 
that thoroughly examined the structure and learning environments of child care centers 
and family child care homes and concluded that they offer very different experiences for 
children (Dowsett, Huston, Imes, & Geenetian, 2008).  
In the current study, family child care homes were generally lower in predicted 
quality and in the subsample performed lower on the ERS assessment. However, family 
child care homes that had higher capacities (overall range = 3 to 8) and offered 
extended care performed better than family child care homes with lower capacities and 
traditional hours. It may be that family child care homes with higher capacities are 
focusing more on the learning environment and implementing methods that align more 
with formal child care. Family child care homes with lower capacities may be licensed, 
meeting the minimal health and safety requirements of the state but, providing more 
informal care. With less than 1% of unregulated care in North Carolina, the family child 
care homes with the lowest capacities may be regulated but, providing a more informal 
service to the communities in which they serve.  In contrast centers that had higher 
capacities (overall range = 5 to 500) and offered extended care were related to lower 
predicted quality compared to their centers with smaller capacities. One explanation for 
this result may be related to the work environments of centers and monitoring of quality 
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by directors may be difficult as centers become too large. Another explanation may be 
that large centers are meeting a demand for care but, in doing so, compromise the level 
of quality.  
Family child care homes that offered extended care also received a boost in 
predicted quality whereas centers that offered extended care received a decrement in 
predicted quality. That is, the family child care homes offering second and/or third shift 
care and meeting higher standards compared to family child care homes operating 
standard hours. In contrast, centers offering second and/or third shift care and meeting 
lower standards compared to centers operating standard hours. Dowsett, Huston, Imes, 
and Geenetian contend, “nuanced observations of different types of care make it clear 
that one type of care is not necessarily ‘better’ than others for all purposes…’ (p. 90). 
There is limited research on programs offering extended care and virtually none that 
constitutes what high quality care looks like during untraditional hours. Furthermore, the 
current study suggests within group variation or unique processes for family child care 
homes and centers related to the option of extended care as they relate to predicted 
quality as defined by licensing points and ERS scores.  
Funding 
Four percent of the programs in the sample received Head Start funding and 6% 
of the programs received More-at-Four funding. At the program level, Head Start and 
More-at-Four funding boosted predicted quality. This is not surprising considering that 
higher quality requirements are tied to Head Start and More-at-Four funds. Both Head 
Start and More-at-Four programs are program-based models targeted for children from 
low-income households to promote school readiness and decrease the achievement 
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gap. Both programs utilize research-based curriculums, and have enhanced standards 
for teacher education and training, class size, and staff-child ratios.  
The current study found Head Start and More-at-Four funding to be related to 
higher predicted quality and supports continuation and expansion of these initiatives. 
Because these funds are related to higher quality and the programs are targeted to 
populations that may otherwise not have access to high quality choices, funding 
additional programs (beyond the 4% and 6% of programs that received Head Start and 
More-at-Funds, respectively, in the current study)  may help to improve accessibility for 
families in need. Although the funds do not seem to be consistently equalizing the 
effects of community level socioeconomics, they are working to close the gap and 
improve quality. For example, the boosts in predicted quality vary depending on the 
community context; however the funds were associated with higher predicted quality 
across contexts. Increasing funds per child in programs already receiving funds may be 
an effective strategy to further narrow the gap associated with community context.  
The interactions between Head Start and More-at-Four with community 
contextual variables present a more nuanced picture of how these funds are currently 
operating within unique contexts. In the full sample 2-level model, Head Start funds had 
the most impact in communities with less concentrated affluence. In other words, 
programs receiving Head Start funding realized a boost in predicted quality, with larger 
boosts associated with greater funding levels. The magnitude of the boost, though, 
decreased as community affluence increased. Thus, the increment in quality from Head 
Start funding was greatest in the least affluent communities. This result is important 
because it suggests Head Start funding had the greatest impact in the communities with 
the greatest need. However, this result changed in the full sample 3-level model when 
83 
 
accounting for Smart Start quality enhancement funds. When accounting for county level 
Smart Start quality enhancement funds, Head Start funds continued to be related to 
higher predicted quality. However, in this case, the magnitude of the boost in predicted 
quality was greatest in communities of higher concentrated affluence. In this model, 
when Smart Start quality enhancement funds were entered into the equation, the effect 
associated with concentrated affluence was greater. Although programs in both high and 
low affluent communities receive a boost in predicted quality associated with Head Start 
funding, the magnitude of the boost is greatest for programs located in more affluent 
areas. The difference in the results based on the 2- and 3-level model may be a function 
of the Smart Start funding entered at the county level rather than the program level. That 
is, programs do not equally benefit from the Smart Start quality enhancement funding 
therefore understanding the program level effect of this source of funding may alter the 
3-level results.  
In the subsample, including the programs with the ERS assessment, Head Start 
funds were related to predicted licensing points as a main effect. That is, when the 
sample was restricted to the programs that underwent the voluntary ERS assessment, 
contextual variables did not interact with Head Start funds. Head Start provided the 
same boost in predicted quality to all programs across contexts.  In contrast, when the 
outcome variable was changed to the program scores on the ERS, Head Start funds 
interacted with all four zip code level variables: concentrated disadvantage, concentrated 
immigration, residential stability, and concentrated affluence. Because the ERS scores 
are a more detailed measure of global classroom quality compared to the licensing 
points, these interactions differentially predict more proximal experiences children are 
having in the classroom including processual quality. Although Head Start funds are 
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related to higher predicted ERS scores, the funding is not able to fully equalize the 
effects associated with the contexts in which the programs operate. That is, predicted 
ERS scores were related to Head Start dollars differentially depending on the context. 
For example, the greatest boost in predicted ERS scores associated with Head Start 
funds was in more privileged contexts that included less concentrated disadvantage, 
less concentrated immigration, more residential stability, and less concentrated 
affluence.  
Similarly, in the full sample 2-level and 3-level models, More-at-Four funds 
yielded the greatest boost in predicted quality when programs receiving the funds were 
in communities with less concentrated disadvantage. That is, even with the More-at-Four 
funds, programs in communities with concentrated disadvantage were not able to 
compensate for the negative effect associated with the community context. In the 
subsample, including only the programs that participated in the ERS assessment, More-
at-Four funds were a main effect in predicting licensing points and ERS scores. When 
the sample was restricted to higher quality programs, More-at-Four funds were directly 
related to higher predicted quality through licensing points and the ERS scores. This is 
likely an artifact of the restricted sample representing higher quality programs.   
Clearly, program-level funds of Head Start and More-at-Four were positively 
related to predicted quality; but they did not seem to be sufficient to consistently propel 
programs beyond decrements associated with concentrated disadvantage or lower 
levels of concentrated affluence. This is of particular concern since these programs are 
intended to increase access to high quality early care and education for populations at 
risk. It is questionable whether or not additional funds would be able to close this gap or 
if there are processes that create barriers in reaching higher standards such as greater 
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life stressors in the lives of the teachers, children and families in these programs. 
Important to emphasize, regardless of context, these funds were positively related to 
higher predicted quality both in licensing points for the full and subsample and ERS 
scores in the subsample.  
Unlike the funds associated with the intervention programs, DCD subsidy funds 
were not consistently related to higher quality. Subsidy funds are intended to assist low-
income families obtain quality child care so that parents can work. In the full sample 2-
level model there was a relationship between DCD subsidy funds and higher licensing 
points with the most DCD funds equalizing the effect of community level concentrated 
affluence. However, in the full sample 3-level model, DCD subsidy funds were not able 
to supersede the effect associated with concentrated affluence.  In other words, the 
boost in predicted quality associated with concentrated affluence was compromised with 
greater subsidy funds. Again, this change in results from the 2 to the 3-level model may 
be a function of the Smart Start funds accounted for at the county level rather than the 
program level. 
Furthermore, in the full sample 3-level model, DCD subsidy funds worked in 
tandem with Smart Start quality enhancement funds to yield the greatest impact in 
quality among programs receiving the greatest DCD subsidy funds and the greatest 
county level Smart Start quality enhancement funds. This is an example of two funding 
programs jointly influencing predicted quality as defined by licensing points. For 
example, the magnitude of the boost associated with the additive effect of DCD subsidy 
funding and Smart Start quality enhancement funding was greatest for programs located 
in counties with the most quality enhancement funds and that received the most DCD 
subsidy funding. Because North Carolina has tiered reimbursement rates associated 
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with the rated license, it is plausible that programs may aim for higher licensing points to 
receive higher subsidy rates. For example, more stars in the rated license, informed by 
licensing points, yield higher subsidy payments per subsidized child. Therefore, if 
programs are interested in being reimbursed at a higher rate for enrolling subsidized 
children, they may be motivated to undergo the steps to increase their licensing points. 
Furthermore, the county quality enhancement funds assist programs in meeting the 
higher standards (e.g. helping to prepare for the ERS assessment, providing grants for 
equipment, providing training for the teachers, etc.) to achieve more points and 
subsequently more stars. Results from the current study suggest that one funding 
source alone was not able to leverage improved quality as effectively as both sources 
together.  
In the subsample, ERS scores were negatively related to DCD subsidy funds. 
This finding supports past research where subsidy density was negatively related to 
global quality (Cassidy, Lower, Kintner, & Hestenes, 2009; Jones-Branch, Torquati, 
Raikes, & Edwards, 2004). In contrast, there is also research that suggests that 
subsidies are related to higher quality (Fuller, Raudenbush, Wei, & Holloway, 1993; 
Rigby, Ryan & Brooks-Gunn, 2007). Based on the current study where results changed 
depending on the model, the sample, and the outcome variable (either licensing points 
or ERS scores), it is not surprising that there are mixed results in the literature. Rigby, 
Ryan, and Brooks-Gunn found that states that offered higher subsidy rates had higher 
quality in non-profit centers, suggesting differential policies may impact the magnitude at 
which subsidies can leverage quality. In a study of 17 states, North Carolina had the 
second greatest percentage of children who received subsidy in regulated care with the 
greatest percentage of these children in centers (85%) (Burnstein & Layzer, 2007). The 
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subsidy rates in North Carolina vary by county, star rating, age of child, and program 
type. Generally, five star centers receive the highest rates. Although North Carolina has 
tiered reimbursement for subsidies, the funds are not connected to a set of standards 
like intervention programs such as Head Start and More-at-Four. Historically, subsidy 
funds are designed to cover the cost of a slot in a child care program so that parents are 
able to work. In North Carolina subsidy rates are based on 75% of the market rate so, 
one may argue that subsidy funds are not designed to cover the full cost of providing 
high quality care for low-income children which also sends a message that low-income 
children are not deserving of the full cost of high quality child care. Competing goals 
associated with subsidy funds may compromise the potential impact of subsidy to 
leverage quality improvement. That is, if subsidy funds are designed to only cover the 
cost of 75% of a child care slot in a program, they may not be sufficient to finance efforts 
to improve quality (e.g. reduce ratios, hire more educated teachers, improve the physical 
environment, etc.).   
Adams and Rohacek (2002) recommend that policy around subsidy also include 
child development goals. While this is a commendable recommendation, currently there 
is not adequate funding to meet the waiting list with the existing funding structures 
(Burnstein & Layzer, 2007; National Women’s Law Center, 2008) Therefore, there must 
be a balance between serving more families and ensuring high quality. The interaction 
between Smart Start quality enhancement funds and DCD subsidy funds suggests 
funding sources may be able to work together to accomplish the goal of assisting 
parental work as well as optimizing children’s learning experiences. This requires 
coordination among policy, funding, and organizations. 
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Like the other funding sources, in the full sample, Smart Start quality 
enhancement funds were positively related to predicted quality (licensing points) but, did 
so differentially based on the community contexts in which they were directed. In the full 
sample, communities with less residential stability and the highest concentrated 
affluence benefited most from the quality enhancement funds. Although quality 
enhancement funds were related to higher predicted licensing points, they were not able 
to equalize the effects of residential stability or concentrated affluence in the full sample. 
That is, communities with less residential stability and higher concentrated affluence 
demonstrated the greatest boost in predicted licensing points associated with quality 
enhancement funds. Bryant, Maxwell, & Burchinal (1999) also found a positive 
relationship between Smart Start funding and child care quality based on ERS scores. In 
contrast, in the current study with the restricted sample, and ERS scores as the 
outcome, this was not found. This result may be a function of the restricted sample – the 
voluntary nature of having an ERS assessment conducted – since predicted licensing 
points in the full sample, and full range of quality in North Carolina, were related to 
higher quality enhancement funds.  
Selection Effects of the Sub-Sample 
Because the ERS assessment is a voluntary component of the rated license, it 
was important to determine if the voluntary nature resulted in selection effects in the 
sample. Results suggested that programs do not equally participate in the ERS 
observational assessment and that both program and community level characteristics 
influence the likelihood of participation. With a binary outcome, HGLM models the odds 
that a program will undergo the voluntary ERS assessment based on the predictors 
(Raundenbush & Bryk, 2002). Centers are more likely to participate in the assessment 
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process compared to family child care homes with slight differentiation among centers 
and family child care homes based on extended care. These results also align with the 
trends associated with predicted quality in the conditional models. More specifically, 
centers without extended care are the most likely to participate with family child care 
homes without extended care the least likely to participate. Higher relative capacities in 
centers and homes also were related to the likelihood of participation. It is not surprising 
that centers are more likely to participate in the assessment since they tend to be more 
business oriented and are considered more formal in their practices. Centers also 
receive higher subsidy rates compared to family child care homes, even with the same 
number of stars (e.g. in the same county infant care in a five star center is $694 per slot 
and in a five star family child care home is $478; North Carolina Division of Child 
Development, 2007a; 2007b). However, it seems that as family child care homes 
increase their capacity (with the highest licensed capacity of 8 children), they too may be 
adhering to more formal practices and thus more likely than other family child care 
homes to participate in the assessment. Since less than 1% of programs are 
unregulated in North Carolina, family child care homes that provide care for small 
capacities of children may also be offering the least formal environment for children with 
little interest in participating in higher licensing standards. 
Furthermore, as in the conditional models predicting quality, residential stability 
was negatively related to the likelihood of participation. Based on the conditional models, 
this would be expected since the higher quality programs in the full sample seem to be in 
communities where there is more family transiency. As mentioned earlier this may be 
related to the density of children in the early years (Queralt & White, 1998) thus creating 
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demand and competition among programs to meet higher licensing standards and earn 
more stars. 
More-at-Four funds were directly related to the likelihood of participation in the 
assessment process. This is not surprising considering the observational assessment is 
a requirement of the More-at-Four program. Furthermore, other program level funding 
sources – Head Start and DCD – were involved in interactions with community level 
characteristics in predicting the likelihood of participation. Head Start funds were related 
to participation; however in areas where there were greater percentages of concentrated 
immigration, programs were less likely to participate. This may be a result of less formal 
care options in these communities. Alternatively, the demand for enhanced standards 
may be less if communities are made up of recently immigrated residents that do not 
have as much information about the North Carolina child care system. DCD funds 
marginally interacted with concentrated immigration where programs with less DCD 
subsidy funds and in communities of higher concentrated immigration were less likely to 
participate but, as DCD funds increased they were more likely to participate. If parents 
are accessing child care subsidies they may be more aware of the child care system 
creating a higher demand for enhanced licensing standards or in other words more 
stars. Alternatively, programs accepting DCD subsidy funds may be enhancing their 
standards in order to receive a higher rate of subsidy. Furthermore, programs in the 
most affluent communities and receiving the highest levels of DCD subsidy funding were 
the most likely to participate in the assessment process. Again, these programs may be 
securing higher subsidy rates by electing to participate in the assessment process to 
increase their stars. Additionally, in more affluent communities there may be more 
demand and ability to pay for higher quality child care.   
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Conclusion 
The North Carolina rated license is designed to inform consumers as well as to 
promote quality improvement among programs. Quality for the full sample was based on 
total licensing points. Minimal standards (or one star programs) were meeting basic 
health and safety requirements that the state deems important for children. However, in 
a system where there is room for programs to operate under different standards; that is, 
moving up in stars through staff education and/or through the learning environment, 
differentiation in what children experience results. This begs the question, who is 
privileged by a system that allows children to be cared and educated in programs of 
differential quality? That is, some programs operate under minimal health and safety 
requirements while others operate under enhanced standards that include more 
educated teachers and learning environments related to better developmental outcomes 
for children. Who benefits most from such a system? 
In a system honoring “parent choice”, there must be evidence that there is 
actually sufficient supply for choices to be made. There is no question that North 
Carolina is a leader in the nation in child care policy with one of the first rated licenses, 
legislation that requires basic health and safety in licensed programs, rewards for 
meeting higher standards such as higher subsidy rates, and coordinated quality 
enhancement efforts at the county level. Furthermore, North Carolina estimates that less 
than 1% of programs are unregulated, where health and safety standards cannot be 
assumed. All children in licensed care experience a minimal level of quality that the state 
currently legislates as adequate. However, when given the opportunity to place children 
in programs that only meet basic health and safety requirements compared to programs 
that are offering enhanced learning environments, it seems logical that providing children 
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with more optimal learning environments is best. But, with access limited and 
affordability central to consumers, choice also becomes limited.  
In an effort to more thoroughly examine the impact of the rated license on supply 
of high quality child care across community contexts, the current study aimed to: (a) 
examine the variation in child care quality across communities of various size (zip codes 
versus counties), (b) examine the relationship between state and federal funding and 
child care quality, (c) examine the relationship between child care quality and the 
socioeconomic context of communities, (d) examine the extent county level Smart Start 
funding influences the relationship between socioeconomic context of communities and 
child care quality, and (e) examine the socioeconomic contexts of child care programs 
participating and not participating in the voluntary assessment process.  
In short, it was found that child care quality varied across communities and that 
program quality was most readily predicted by proximity. More-at-Four and Head Start 
funding were related to higher quality; however they were not able to entirely equalize 
the effects of community context in order to ensure children in these programs were 
receiving equitable care and education of their more affluent peers. There were mixed 
results as to whether DCD subsidy funding was able to leverage quality alone. Despite 
these mixed results, there was evidence that DCD subsidy worked in tandem with Smart 
Start funding as well as the rated license system supporting enhanced standards 
through tiered reimbursement rates. Furthermore, there was evidence from the full 
sample model that suggested that Smart Start quality enhancement funds were helping 
to improve child care quality in North Carolina. The community context including 
concentrated affluence, concentrated disadvantage, and residential stability were related 
to child care quality.  Finally, selection effects associated with the likelihood of 
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participation in the ERS assessment process were found. That is, differential 
participation in the observational component of the licensing system was related to 
program level characteristics and community context. In sum, access to high quality 
child care is not universal and the application of current policy is not equally within reach 
of all programs. That is, participation in the voluntary ERS assessment is not equally 
likely among programs and across community contexts. These results are compelling, 
problematic, and suggest needed attention.   
Limitations and Future Research 
A major strength of the current study is the use of existing data from multiple 
sources. However, using existing data also creates limitations due to the nature of data 
collection and means of connectivity to other data sets. Because Head Start funds were 
allocated to the funding agency, program level funds had to be estimated based on the 
number of programs within funding agencies and the capacity of these programs. There 
is likely some level of error in these estimations. Future research that incorporates exact 
Head Start funds allocated to programs is recommended.  Furthermore, Smart Start 
quality enhancement funds were allocated at the county level.  In future research it 
would be beneficial to understand the exact funding received by programs from Smart 
Start and what funds were used for at the program level. The census data provided an 
estimate of community contexts; however, it is dated and some contexts may have 
changed since its collection. Replication of this study with new census data is 
recommended.  
The current study included the socioeconomics at the zip code level to better 
understand the contexts of programs performing best in North Carolina’s rated license. 
Furthermore the child care system is dynamic and the current study is limited by the 
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variables that are included and by default the variables that are missing at the program 
and community levels. It is recommended that future studies include more program level 
characteristics. Additionally, following up with programs in a qualitative study to 
illuminate barriers programs face in meeting enhanced standards would allow for more 
depth in identifying needs. It would also allow us to better understand the complexities 
programs face as a result of the context in which they operate and the population they 
serve. Finally, the current study was based on programs nested within communities. 
More information about the children that attend programs would add an additional level 
to the analyses and further address the question of accessibility.  It would also be 
beneficial to examine differences in the results for different age groups. In the current 
study child care quality was examined at the program level rather than classroom level. 
Examining differentiation in quality for infants, toddlers, and preschoolers based on 
program characteristics and community context would provide the possibility of unique 
effects based on children’s ages.  
Despite the limitations of the current study, the results yielded evidence that 
there is more that North Carolina needs to do to ensure all children are receiving 
equitable care and education during the most malleable years of life.  
Policy Recommendations 
 The current study suggests the child care system does not function independent 
of the multiple contexts in which programs are nested. It is clear that the application of 
policies, like the rated license, do not equally impact all communities or programs. The 
current study supports the importance of aligning policies that support working parents 
with policies that support the learning environments of their children (Adams and 
Rohaccek , 2002; Huston, 2004). 
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When there is evidence that suggests programs of minimal standards are most 
likely to be found in communities of less affluence and more disadvantage compared to 
enhanced standards in communities of more affluence and less disadvantage, are we 
letting our most vulnerable children and their families down? Policy makers must ask 
themselves if basic health and safety requirements of one star programs are enough for 
our most vulnerable children and policies must work to move programs beyond minimal 
standards. That is, policies must first work to help programs enhance their standards, 
making it possible to help teachers improve their education, for programs to financially 
be able to reduce ratios, and equip classrooms. Then, the minimal standard may be 
raised in order to institutionalize the effect. In contrast, if standards are increased without 
first preparing the programs, we risk increasing the percentage of children in unregulated 
care. Therefore, policy must support field workers to assist programs in raising and 
sustaining quality through programs like the rated license, More-at-Four, Head Start, 
DCD subsidy, and Smart Start so that policy makers can then raise the bar for what is 
minimally accepted.  
While a public campaign educating parents about the rated license and the 
benefits of high quality care may be worthwhile, it is clear that we cannot rely on parents 
alone to push quality. Programs in communities of lower socioeconomics need additional 
support to perform at the same level of programs in more affluent areas in the form of 
enhanced learning environments and educating staff on child development and early 
education. Policy makers must be informed of the complex and multifaceted needs of 
children living in poverty and that the teachers serving these children are in need of 
additional supports in order to adequately educate and care for these children. Subsidy 
dollars may be covering the basic fees of the program so that parents can work and 
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children are in a licensed program; but, additional funds are likely needed to ensure 
environments that promote optimal development among the children with the most 
needs. This may require lower ratios and smaller group sizes so that there is greater 
levels of teacher-child interactions. This may also include financing educational 
opportunities for the teachers themselves to learn how to best work with children with 
multiple risk factors.  
If programs are provided with the resources to offer higher quality care, they may 
be more likely to equally engage in the voluntary component of the rated license. 
However, additional steps should also be taken to create opportunities for programs to 
engage in this part of the license, especially among the programs that are the least likely 
to participate. Furthermore, programs that are least likely to participate may need 
incentives to participate in this component of the license as well as assistance in 
preparing for the assessment so that it is more attainable across contexts. For example, 
since family child care homes were less likely to participate in the rated license and they 
were generally of lower quality than centers, it may be worthwhile to target this group of 
care providers. One way to facilitate this may be to increase subsidy rates for enhanced 
standards so that they are more comparable to child care centers. 
In conclusion, the current study of child care quality across community contexts 
suggests that there is inequitable access to high quality child care based on race and 
class. Furthermore, there is evidence that child care programs participate differentially in 
the rated license system suggesting program and community level barriers may exist in 
improving quality. While past research suggests children in and near poverty and 
children of color are the least likely to be in high quality child care settings, the current 
study found this may be because high quality programs are least likely to be in the 
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communities in which these children reside. If the child care system allows for variation 
in quality, we must ensure access is not determined by socioeconomics and that all 
children in child care have experiences that promote their optimal development.  
Although North Carolina is viewed as a leader in child care policy across the nation, the 
children and families, especially the most vulnerable, are counting on us not just to do 
better but, to do right. 
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Table 1. Program Level Variable Correlations
Program 
Type 
Extended 
Care 
Program 
Type * 
Extended 
Care
Licensed 
Capacity
 Licensed 
Capacity * 
Program 
Type
Head Start 
Funding 
More-at-
Four 
Funding 
DCD 
Subsidy 
Funding 
Licensing 
Points
ERS 
Program 
Average
n = 6882
Program Type 1
Extended Care -.455** 1
Program Type * Extended Care .395** .362** 1
Licensed Capacity .853** -.470** .206** 1
Licensed Capacity * Program Type .958** -.483** .305** .963** 1
Head Start Funding .220** -.199** -.067** .172** .202** 1
More-at-Four Funding .282** -.190** .015 .297** .302** .411** 1
DCD Subsidy Funding .177** .246** .237** .156** .169** -.235** -.039** 1
Licensing Points .253** -.043** .061** .236** .248** .200** .257** .247** 1
n = 2964
ERS Program Average .059** -.104** -.050** .030 .043* .058** .107** -.136** .660** 1
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Tables
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.
% Below 
Poverty
% Receiving 
Public 
Assistance
% 
Unemployed
% Female 
Headed 
Family with 
Child(ren)
% Black or 
African 
American 
(not 
Hispanic)
% Latino or 
Hispanic
% Foreign 
Born
% Living in 
the Same 
House for 5 
Years or 
More
% Owner 
Occupied 
Homes
% of Families 
with Incomes 
75K or Higher
% of 
Population 
with at Least 
a Bachelors 
Degree
% Employed in 
a Professional 
or Managerial 
Occupation
% White or 
European 
American 
(not 
Hispanic)
% Below Poverty 1
% Receiving Public 
Assistance .530** 1
% Unemployed .518** ..299** 1
% Female Headed 
Family with 
Child(ren)
..606** ..514** .412** 1
% Black or African 
American (not 
Hispanic)
.575** .594** .360** .678** 1
% Latino or 
Hispanic .130** .040 .053 .120** .074 1
% Foreign Born -0.20 -.097* -.024 .103* .024 .865** 1
% Living in the 
Same House for 5 
Years or More
.180* .208** -.079* -.139** .078 -.228** -.442** 1
% Owner Occupied 
Homes -.360** -.199** -.401** -.599** -.333** -.271** -.376** .537** 1
% of Families with 
Incomes 75K or 
Higher
-.566** -.459** -.274** -.299** -.292** -.094* .188* -.440** 075 1
% of Population with 
at Least a Bachelors 
Degree
-.358** -.386** -.041 -.111** -.222** -.046 .285** -.623** -.277** .798** 1
% Employed in a 
Professional or 
Managerial 
Occupation
-.359** -.410** -.096* -.138** -.226** -.088** .211** -.547** -.203** .793** .923** 1
% White or 
European American 
(not Hispanic)
-.611** -.594** -.396** -.701** -.911** -.281** -.230** -.022 .381** .290** .201** .299** 1
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 2. Variable Correlations of Socioeconomic Context Scales (N = 619)
Co
n.
 D
is
ad
va
nt
ag
e
Co
n.
 Im
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ig
ra
tio
n
Re
si
de
nt
ia
l S
ta
bi
lit
y
Co
n.
 A
ff
lu
en
ce
** Significant at the 0.01 level.
Concentrated 
Disadvantage
Concentrated 
Immigration
Residential 
Stability
Concentrated 
Affluence
% White or European 
American (not Hispanic)
Concentrated 
Disadvantage 1
Concentrated 
Immigration .066 1
Residential 
Stability -.239** -.382** 1
Concentrated 
Affluence -.331** .076 -.404** 1
% White or 
European 
American (not 
Hispanic)
-902** -266** .220** .249** 1
Table 3. Community Level Socioeconomic Scale Correlations (N = 619)
** Significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 4. Full Sample 2-Level Modeling (N = 6882)
Unconditional Effective            1-Level Full 2-Level 
Reduced           
2-Level 
Effective            
2-Level
Fixed Effects
Intercept2, γ00 7.13 (0.08)** -2.32 (0.91)** -1.74 (2.19) -2.22 (1.41) -2.21 (1.36)
Con_Dis, γ01 -1.14 (3.32) -1.34 (1.54) -1.35 (1.53)
Con_Imm, γ02 -2.58 (4.49) 0.07 (2.27)
Res_Sta, γ03 -3.61 (2.25) -3.11 (1.04)** -3.12 (0.94)**
Con_Afl, γ04 5.04 (1.94)** 5.35 (1.51)** 5.35 (1.51)**
Program Type, γ10  8.02 (1.01)** 10.11 (2.15)** 8.07 (1.18)** 8.07 (1.18)**
     Con_Dis, γ 11 -3.83 (2.79)
     Con_Imm, γ 12 -3.39 (4.28)
     Res_Sta, γ 13 -2.05 (1.96)
     Con_Afl, γ 14 2.64 (1.97) 3.46 (1.42)* 3.46 (1.42)*
Extended Care,  γ20 0.87 (0.19)** -0.00 (1.47) 0.83 (0.19)** 0.83 (0.19)**
     Con_Dis, γ 21 1.09 (2.54)
     Con_Imm, γ 22 -2.00 (3.45)
     Res_Sta, γ 23 0.80 (1.67)
     Con_Afl, γ 24 1.37 (1.51)
Program Type * Extended Care, γ30 -1.41 (0.26)** -1.32 (0.27)** -1.37 (0.26)** -1.37 (0.26)**
Capacity, γ40 2.95 (0.45)** 3.30 (0.48)** 3.29 (0.48)** 3.29 (0.48)**
Program Type * Capacity, γ50 -3.01 (0.46)** -3.42 (0.49)** -3.41 (0.49)** -3.41 (0.49)**
Head Start Funds,  γ60 0.44 (0.03)** 0.35 (0.39) 0.68 (0.08)** 0.68 (0.08)**
     Con_Dis, γ 61 0.03 (0.63)
     Con_Imm, γ 62 -0.24 (0.75)
     Res_Sta, γ 63 0.46 (0.43)
     Con_Afl, γ 64 -0.77 (0.43) -1.05 (0.35)** -1.05 (0.35)**
More-at-Four Funds, γ70 0.47 (.03)** 0.73 (0.36)* 0.63 (0.04)** 0.63 (0.4)**
     Con_Dis, γ 71 -1.08 (0.62) -1.19 (0.35)** -1.19 (0.35)**
     Con_Imm, γ 72 -0.11 (0.68)
     Res_Sta, γ 73 -0.09 (0.40)
     Con_Afl, γ 74 -0.28 (0.45)
DCD Subsidy Funds, γ80 0.36 (0.02)** 0.34 (0.30) 0.54 (0.05)** 0.54 (0.05)**
     Con_Dis, γ 81 0.21 (0.44)
     Con_Imm, γ 82 0.95 (0.51)
     Res_Sta, γ 83 0.18 (0.33)
     Con_Afl, γ 84 -0.65 (0.27)* -0.69 (0.19)** -0.69 (0.19)**
  Level 1 Variance, rij 20.61 16.11
  Intercept1, μ0j 1.28** 1.97** 1.37** 1.42** 1.42**
  Program Type, μ1j 1.86** 1.23** 1.24** 1.54**
  DCD Subsidy Funds, μ8j 0.16** 0.01, (p  ≤  0.059) 0.11 0.01
Intraclass Correlation 0.06
Goodness of fit
  Deviance (-2LL) 40618.83 39028.06 38928.11 38938.05 38938.05
  Estimated Parameters 3 17 41 25 24
Liklihood Ratio Test p  ≥ 0.50 p  ≥ 0.50
** Significant at the 0.01 level.
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
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Random Effects (Variance Components)
Table 5. Full Sample 3-Level Modeling (N = 6727)
Unconditional Effective 2-Level Full 3-Level Effective 3-Level
Fixed Effects
Intercept3, Π000 7.11 (0.13)** -2.21 (1.36) -20.42 (9.33)* -19.68 (7.34)**
Quality Enhancement Funds, Π001 1.13 (0.61) 1.09 (0.45)*
Con_Dis, Π010 -1.35 (1.53) -1.52 (17.42) -0.24 (1.45)
     Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 011 0.049 (1.21)
Res_Sta, Π020 -3.12 (0.94)** 23.33 (9.42)* 21.56 (9.71)*
     Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 021 -1.73 (0.62)** -1.59 (0.62)**
Con_Afl, Π030 5.35 (1.51)** 35.18 (17.60)* 34.48 (7.96)**
     Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 031 -1.76 (1.16) -1.80 (0.53)**
Program Type, Π100 8.07 (1.18)** 11.42 )4.98)* 7.85 (1.39)**
      Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 101 -0.21 (0.32)
     Con_Afl, Π 130 3.46 (1.42)* -14.20 (19.71) 3.14 (1.60)*
          Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 131 1.05 (1.31)
Extended Care,  Π200 0.83 (0.19)** 0.81 (0.19)** 0.85 (0.18)**
Program Type * Extended Care, Π300 -1.37 (0.26)** -1.30 (0.26)** -1.42 (0.26)**
Capacity, Π400 3.29 (0.48)** 3.26 (0.67)** 3.18 (0.63)**
Program Type * Capacity, Π500 -3.41 (0.49)** -3.39 (0.69)** -3.30 (0.65)**
Head Start Funds,  Π600 0.68 (0.08)** -0.09 (0.10) 0.70 (0.07)**
      Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 601 0.05 (0.07)
      Con_Afl, Π 630 -1.05 (0.35)** 2.38 (2.94) -1.12 (0.32)**
          Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 631 -0.24 (0.20)
More-at-Four Funds, Π700 0.63 (0.4)** 1.10 (0.85) 0.62 (0.06)**
      Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 701 -0.03 (0.06)
      Con_Dis, Π 710 -1.19 (0.35)** -6.04 (5.41) -1.10 (0.41)**
          Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 711 0.34 (0.36)
DCD Subsidy Funds, Π800 0.54 (0.05)** -0.40 (0.60) 0.01 (0.30)
      Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 801 0.07 (0.04) 0.04 (0.02)~
      Con_Afl, Π 830 -0.69 (0.19)** 0.60 (2.16) -0.86 (0.19)**
          Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 831 -0.10 (0.14)
Random Effects (Variance Components)
  Level 1 Variance, rijk 20.72 16.10 16.10 16.24
  Intercept1, μ0ik 0.27** 1.42** 0.46** 0.68**
  Program Type, μ1ik 1.54** 0.83** 1.50**
  DCD Subsidy Funding, μ8ik 0.01, p  ≤ 0.064 0.001**
  Intercept1/Intercept2, δ00k 0.77** 3.54 0.73**
  Intercept1/Con_Dis, δ01k 16.48
  Intercept1/Res_Sta, δ02k 3.59
  Intercept1/Co_Afl, δ03k 12.84
  Program Type/Intercept2, δ10k 3.04
  Program Type/Con_Afl, δ13k 29.10
  DCD Funds/Intercept2, δ80k 0.03
  DCD Funds/Con_Afl, δ83k 0.24
Level 2 Intraclass Correlation 0.01
Level 3 Intraclass Correlation 0.04
Level 2 and 3 Intraclass Correlation 0.05
Goodness of fit
  Deviance (-2LL) 39637.35 38938.05 38053.66 38085.48
  Estimated Parameters 4 24 71 25
Liklihood Ratio Test p  ≥ 0.50
~p  ≤ 0.057
** Significant at the 0.01 level.
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 6. HGLM 2-Level Modeling (N = 6882)
Fixed Effects Coefficient (SE)
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient (SE)
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient (SE)
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient (SE)
Odds 
Ratio
Intercept2, γ00 -0.31 (0.04)** 0.73  -3.44 (0.59)** 0.03 -3.44 (1.40)** 0.03 -3.26 (0.82)** 0.04
Con_Dis, γ01 -1.91 (2.25) 0.15 -2.64 (0.94)** 0.07
Con_Imm, γ02 -2.70 (2.70) 0.07 -3.11 (2.24) 0.04
Res_Sta, γ03 -1.83 (1.49) 0.16 -1.87 (0.68)** 0.15
Con_Afl, γ04 3.99 (0.99)** 54.31 3.65 (0.71)** 38.47
Program Type, γ10 1.56 (0.66)* 4.77 2.96 (1.32) 19.37 2.09 (0.66)** 8.11
     Con_Dis, γ 11 -1.98 (1.71) 0.14
     Con_Imm, γ 12 -2.87 (2.39) 0.06
     Res_Sta, γ 13 -0.70 (1.28) 0.50
     Con_Afl, γ 14 -0.15 (1.03) 0.87
Extended Care,  γ20 0.30 (0.13)* 1.34 0.23 (1.07) 1.26 0.32 (0.10)** 1.37
     Con_Dis, γ 21 0.64 (1.65) 1.89
     Con_Imm, γ 22 -0.54 (2.75) 0.58
     Res_Sta, γ 23 0.42 (1.23) 1.52
     Con_Afl, γ 24 -1.00 (0.96) 0.37
Program Type * Extended 
Care, γ30 -0.39 (0.16)* 0.68 -0.39 (0.16)* 0.68 -0.43 (0.14)** 0.65
Capacity, γ40 0.70 (0.28)** 2.02 0.90 (0.31)** 2.45 0.90 (0.29)** 2.46
Program Type * Capacity, γ50 -0.43 (0.30) 0.65 -0.68 (0.32)* 0.51 -0.67 (0.30)* 0.51
Head Start Funds,  γ60 0.32 (0.03)** 1.37 0.35 (0.65) 1.42 0.42 (0.05)** 1.52
     Con_Dis, γ 61 0.22 (0.75) 1.25
     Con_Imm, γ 62 -1.64 (1.21) 0.19 -1.58 (0.70)* 0.21
     Res_Sta, γ 63 0.22 (0.73) 1.24
     Con_Afl, γ 64 -0.53 (0.70) 0.59
More-at-Four Funds, γ70 0.33 (0.03)** 1.38 0.72 (0.53) 2.05 0.33 (0.03)** 1.40
     Con_Dis, γ 71 -0.98 (0.67) 0.37
     Con_Imm, γ 72 0.79 (1.13) 2.21
     Res_Sta, γ 73 -0.34 (0.57) 0.71
     Con_Afl, γ 74 -0.45 (0.66) 0.64
DCD Subsidy Funds, γ80 0.14 (0.01)** 1.15 0.23 (0.14) 1.26 0.23 (0.03)** 1.26
     Con_Dis, γ 81 -0.05 (0.29) 0.96
     Con_Imm, γ 82 0.62 (0.41) 1.87 0.51 (0.28)~ 1.67
     Res_Sta, γ 83 -0.01 (0.16) 0.99
     Con_Afl, γ 84 -0.35 (0.13)** 0.70 -0.37 (0.09)** 0.69
  Intercept1, μ0i 0.52, p  ≥ 0.50
  Program Type, μ1i 0.56, p  ≥ 0.50
  Capacity, μ4i 0.02, p  ≥ 0.50
  DCD Subsidy Funds, μ8i 0.01, p  ≥ 0.27
Goodness of fit
  Deviance (-2LL)
  Estimated Parameters
Liklihood Ratio Test
~ p  ≤ 0.07
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
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2 10 36 19
p  ≥ 0.50
** Significant at the 0.01 level.
0.26, p  ≥ 0.09 0.53, p  ≥ 0.12
21747.30 20384.18 20282.40 20296.80
Unconditional Unconditional 1-Level Full 2-Level Effective 2-Level
0.49** 0.51**
Random Effects (Variance Components)
Fixed Effects Coefficient (SE)
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient (SE)
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient (SE)
Odds 
Ratio
Intercept3, Π000 -3.26 (0.82)** 0.04 -4.87 (2.61)~ 0.01 -4.16 (2.35)~ 0.02
Quality Enhancement Funds, Π001 0.03 (0.16) 1.03 -0.01 (0.14) 0.99
Con_Dis, Π010 -2.64 (0.94)** 0.07 -0.80 (1.58) 0.45 -0.82 (1.51) 0.44
Con_Imm, Π020 -3.11 (2.24) 0.04 -0.52 (3.41) 0.60 -0.52 (3.41) 0.59
Res_Sta, Π030 -1.87 (0.68)** 0.15 -0.81 (1.37) 0.45 -0.81 (1.30) 0.45
Con_Afl, Π040 3.65 (0.71)** 38.47 3.83 (1.00)** 46.11 3.84 (0.99)** 46.39
Program Type, Π100 2.09 (0.66)** 8.11 4.08 (2.52) 59.13 2.07 (1.20)~ 7.91
     Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 101 -0.14 (0.19) 0.87
Extended Care,  Π200 0.32 (0.10)** 1.37 0.31 (0.12)** 1.37 0.31 (0.12)** 1.37
Program Type * Extended Care, Π300 -0.43 (0.14)** 0.65 -0.34 (0.18)~ 0.71 -0.35 (0.18)~ 0.71
Capacity, Π400 0.90 (0.29)** 2.46 0.93 (0.51)~ 2.54 0.90 (0.50)~ 2.46
Program Type * Capacity, Π500 -0.67 (0.30)* 0.51 -0.69 (0.53) 0.50 -0.66 (0.52) 0.52
Head Start Funds,  Π600 0.42 (0.05)** 1.52 0.41 (0.06)** 1.51 0.41 (0.06)** 1.51
     Con_Imm, Π 620 -1.58 (0.70)* 0.21 -1.46 (1.14) 0.23 -1.48 (1.13) 0.23
More-at-Four Funds, Π700 0.33 (0.03)** 1.40 0.34 (0.03)** 1.41 0.34 (0.03)** 1.41
DCD Subsidy Funds, Π800 0.23 (0.03)** 1.26 0.24 (0.04)** 1.27 0.24 (0.04)** 1.27
     Con_Imm, Π 820 0.51 (0.28)~ 1.67 0.39 (0.40) 1.48 0.40 (0.40) 1.48
     Con_Afl, Π 840 -0.37 (0.09)** 0.69 -0.37 (0.13)** 0.69 -0.37 (0.13)** 0.69
  Intercept1, μ0ik
  Program Type , μ1ik
  Intercept1/Intercept2, δ00k
  Program Type/Intercept2, δ10k
Goodness of fit
  Deviance (-2LL)
  Estimated Parameters
Liklihood Ratio Test
0.53, p ≤ 0.12 0.27** 0.29**
Table 7. HGLM 3-Level Modeling (N = 6882)
Effective 2-Level Full 3-Level Reduced 3-Level
0.08, p  ≤ 0.18 0.08, p ≤ 0.20
Random Effects (Variance Components)
0.17, p   ≤ 0.24 0.15, p ≤ 0.25
0.51** 0.38** 0.38**
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20296.80 19693.48 19695.06
19 24 23
p  ≥ 0.50 p  ≥ 0.50
** Significant at the 0.01 level.
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
~ Significant at the 0.10 level.
Table 8. Sub Sample 3-Level Modling with Licensing Points as Outcome (N = 2964)
Unconditional Reduced 3-Level Effective 3-Level
Fixed Effects
Intercept3, Π000 11.16 (0.09)** -1.92 (6.40) 1.43 (5.38)
Quality Enhancement Funds, Π001 0.81 (0.39)* 0.63 (0.32)~
Con_Dis, Π010 -2.24 (1.10)* -2.58 (1.01)**
Res_Sta, σ020 16.88 (7.90)* 13.66 (7.63)
     Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 021 -1.27 (0.51)* -1.07 (0.49)*
Con_Afl, Π030 12.26 (7.14) -0.18 (0.95)
     Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 031 -0.74 (0.44)
Program Type, Π100 2.95 (0.86)** 3.01 (0.94)**
     Con_Afl, Π 110 2.14 (0.84)* 1.80 (0.90)*
Extended Care,  Π200 0.52 (0.25)* 0.53 (0.24)*
Program Type * Extended Care, Π300 -0.64 (0.30)* -0.63 (0.29)*
Capacity, Π400 1.45 (0.33)** 1.41 (0.34)**
Program Type * Capacity, Π500 -1.80 (0.34)** -1.77 (0.35)**
Head Start Funds,  Π600 0.12 (0.06) 0.07 (0.02)**
     Con_Afl, Π 610 -0.18 (0.35)
More-at-Four Funds, Π700 0.26 (0.03)** 0.22 (0.2)**
     Con_Dis, Π 710 -0.35 (0.25)
DCD Subsidy Funds, Π800 -0.31 (0.22) -0.10 (0.2)**
      Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 801 0.02 (0.02)
     Con_Afl, Π 810 -0.23 (0.15)
Random Effects (Variance Components)
  Level 1 Variance, rijk 5.98 5.08 5.10
  Intercept1, μ0ik 0.05, p  ≤ 0.27 1.64** 1.51**
  Capacity, μ4ik 0.13** 0.13**
  Intercept1/Intercept2, δ00k 0.32** 0.34** 0.60**
Level 2 Intraclass Correlation 0.01
Level 3 Intraclass Correlation 0.05
Level 2 and 3 Intraclass Correlation 0.06
Goodness of fit
  Deviance (-2LL) 13799.81 13405.21 13412.25
  Estimated Parameters 4 25 20
Liklihood Ratio Test p  ≥ 0.50 p  ≥ 0.50
~p  ≤ 0.056
** Significant at the 0.01 level.
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 9. Sub Sample 2-Level Modeling with ERS Score as Outcome (N = 2964)
Unconditional
Effective 1-
Level Full 2-Level 
Reduced 2-
Level 
Effective 2-
Level
Fixed Effects
Intercept2, γ00 5.13 (0.01)** 4.82 (0.24)** 5.95 (0.56)** 5.38 (0.32)** 5.41 (0.32)**
Con_Dis, γ01 -2.92 (0.87)** -2.13 (0.36)** -2.10 (0.36)**
Con_Imm, γ02 -0.42 (1.24) -0.27 (0.58) -0.25 (0.58)
Res_Sta, γ03 -0.84 (0.55) -0.58 (0.20)** -0.57 (0.20)**
Con_Afl, γ04 -0.88 (0.36)* 0.04 (0.15) 0.05 (0.15)
Program Type, γ10 0.71 (0.26)** 0.53 (0.57) 0.70 (0.26)** 0.63 (0.25)**
     Con_Dis, γ 11 0.58 (0.72)
     Con_Imm, γ 12 1.27 (1.04) 1.42 (0.58)* 1.39 (0.59)*
     Res_Sta, γ 13 -0.17 (0.52)
     Con_Afl, γ 14 0.63 (0.39)
Extended Care,  γ20 0.01 (0.06) -0.19 (0.42) -0.07 (0.07) -0.13 (0.06)*
     Con_Dis, γ 21 1.17 (0.64) 0.85 (0.38)* 0.80 (0.39)*
     Con_Imm, γ 22 0.39 (0.84)
     Res_Sta, γ 23 -0.03 (0.47)
     Con_Afl, γ 24 0.31 (0.36)
Program Type * Extended Care, γ30 -0.08 (0.07) -0.10 (0.07) -0.10 (0.07)
Capacity, γ40 0.22 (0.12) 0.19 (0.12) 0.23 (0.12)* 0.23 (.12)*
Program Type * Capacity, γ50 -0.28 (0.12)* -0.26 (0.12)* -0.29 (0.12)** -0.29 (0.12)**
Head Start Funds,  γ60 -0.01 (0.01)** 0.19 (0.07)** 0.20 (0.06)** 0.20 (0.06)**
     Con_Dis, γ 61 -0.23 (0.10)* -0.21 (0.08)** -0.21 (0.8)**
     Con_Imm, γ 62 -0.28 (0.15) -0.31 (0.13)** -0.31 (0.13)**
     Res_Sta, γ 63 -0.20 (0.08)* -0.22 (0.07)** -0.22 (0.07)**
     Con_Afl, γ 64 -0.16 (0.06)* -0.15 (0.06)** 0.15 (0.06)**
More-at-Four Funds, γ70 0.03 (0.00)** -0.00 (0.06) 0.03 (0.004)** 0.03 (0.004)**
     Con_Dis, γ 71 0.08 (0.10)
     Con_Imm, γ 72 -0.01 (0.11)
     Res_Sta, γ 73 0.02 (0.07)
     Con_Afl, γ 74 0.06 (0.06)
DCD Subsidy Funds, γ80 -0.03 (0.00)** -0.09 (0.05) -0.03 (0.004)** -0.03 (0.004)**
     Con_Dis, γ 81 0.04 (0.09)
     Con_Imm, γ 82 0.01 (0.11)
     Res_Sta, γ 83 0.07 (0.06)
     Con_Afl, γ 84 0.06 (0.04)
  Level 1 Variance, rij 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
  Intercept1, μ0i 0.03** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
  Program Type slope, μ1i 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.05**
Intraclass Correlation 0.08
Goodness of fit
  Deviance (-2LL) 5329.63 5203.51 5203.14 5187.43 5188.19
  Estimated Parameters 2 13 4 4 4
Liklihood Ratio Test p  ≥ 0.50 p  ≥  0.50
** Significant at the 0.01 level.
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
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Random Effects (Variance Components)
Table 10. Sub Sample 3-Level Modeling with ERS Score as Outcome (N = 2964)
Reduced Full 3-Level Effective 3-Level 
Fixed Effects
Intercept3,  Π000 8.65 (1.84)** 8.43 (0.62)**
Quality Enhancement Funds, Π001 -0.24 (0.11)* -0.22 (0.04)**
Con_Dis, Π010 -11.57 (4.31)** -11.83 (3.63)**
     Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 011 0.69 (0.29)* 0.71 (0.24)**
Con_Imm, Π020 -13.22 (4.04)** -12.94 (4.27)**
     Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 021 0.93 (0.27)** 0.91 (0.28)**
Res_Sta, Π030 -0.80 (1.95) -0.23 (0.21)
     Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 031 0.04 (0.12)
Con_Afl, Π040 0.49 (1.96) 0.28 (0.17)~
     Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 041 -0.015 (0.13)
Program Type, Π100 -1.29 (0.81) -1.37 (0.75)~
     Quality Enhancement Funds, Π101 0.12 (0.05)* 0.13 (0.05)**
     Con_Imm, Π 120 14.51 (6.49)* 15.93 (5.78)**
          Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 121 -0.96 (0.43)* -1.05 (0.38)**
Extended Care,  Π200 -2.36 (0.77)** -2.34 (0.76)**
     Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 201 0.16 (0.05)** 0.15 (0.05)**
     Con_Dis, Π 210 9.95 (5.23)~ 10.37 (4.80)*
          Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 211 -0.64 (0.35)~ -0.67 (0.33)*
Capacity, Π300 0.16 (0.11) 0.15 (0.11)
Program Type * Capacity, Π400 -0.21 (0.11)~ -0.21 (0.11)~
Head Start Funds, Π500 -0.62 (1.03) 0.17 (0.06)**
     Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 501 0.06 (0.07)
     Con_Dis, Π 510 0.39 (1.05) -0.13 (0.08)~
          Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 511 -0.04 (0.07)
     Con_Imm, Π 520 1.54 (1.42) -0.24 (0.11)*
          Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 521 -0.13 (0.10)
     Res_Sta, Π 530 0.60 (1.30) -0.18 (0.07)**
          Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 531 -0.06 (0.09)
     Con_Afl, Π 540 0.50 (0.60) -0.15 (0.05)**
          Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 541 -0.05 (0.04)
More-at-Four Funds, Π600 0.02 (0.06) 0.03 (0.005)**
     Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 601 0.02 (0.06)
DCD Subsidy Funds, Π700 -0.004 (0.04) -0.03 (0.004)**
     Quality Enhancement Funds, Π 701 -0.002 (0.003)
Random Effects (Variance Components)
  Level 1 Variance, rijk 0.30 0.30
  Intercept1, μ0ik 0.01** 0.01**
  Program Type, μ1ik 0.02** 0.02**
  Intercept1/Intercept2, δ00k 0.03** 0.03**
  Program Type/Intercept2, δ10k 0.03** 0.03**
Goodness of fit
  Deviance (-2LL) 5019.752555 5021.706741
  Estimated Parameters 41 32
Liklihood Ratio Test p  ≥ 0.50
~ Significant at the 0.10 level.
** Significant at the 0.01 level.
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
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APPENDIX B 
Figures 
Full Sample Effective 2-Level Model Interactions 
 
Figure 1. Program Type and Extended Care 
 
 
Figure 2. Program Type and Licensed Capacity 
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Figure 3. Program Type and Concentrated Affluence 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Head Start Funding and Concentrated Affluence 
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Figure 5. More-at-Four Funding and Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. DCD Subsidy Funding and Concentrated Affluence 
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Full Sample Effective 3-Level Model Interactions 
 
Figure 7. Smart Start Quality Enhancement Funding and Residential Stability 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Smart Start Quality Enhancement Funding and Concentrated Affluence 
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Figure 9. Head Start Funding and Concentrated Affluence 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Smart Start Quality Enhancement Funds and DCD Subsidy Funding 
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Figure 11. DCD Subsidy Funding and Concentrated Affluence 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Program Type and Extended Care 
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Figure 13. Program Type and Licensed Capacity 
 
 
Figure 14. Program Type and Concentrated Affluence 
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Figure 15. More-at-Four Funding and Concentrated Disadvantage 
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Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model Interactions 
 
Figure 16. Program Type and Extended Care 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Program Type and Licensed Capacity 
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Figure 18. Head Start Funding and Concentrated Immigration 
 
 
 
Figure 19.  DCD Subsidy Funding and Concentrated Affluence 
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Figure 20.  DCD Subsidy Funding and Concentrated Immigration 
 
 
 
  
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
-2% 1% 3% 5% 7% 9%
Li
kl
ih
oo
d 
of
 P
ar
ti
ci
pa
ti
on
 
(in
cr
em
en
ta
l e
ff
ec
t)
Concentrated Immigration
0
4.2848 (25th percentile)
6.9187 (50th percentile)
7.7892 (75th percentile)
DCD Subsidy Funding 
[natural log of 1+(DCD 
Subsidy funding/capacity)] 
 
132 
 
Subsample Effective 3-Level Interactions with Licensing Points as Outcome 
 
Figure 21. Program Type and Extended Care 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Program Type and Licensed Capacity 
 
 
 
  
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
0.00 1.00
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
Li
ce
ns
in
g 
Po
in
ts
 
(in
cr
em
en
ta
l e
ff
ec
t)
Extended Care
(0 = no, 1 = yes)
0
1
0
1
2
3
4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
Li
ce
ns
in
g 
Po
in
ts
(in
cr
em
en
ta
l e
ff
ec
t)
Licensed Capacity
(natural log of licensed capacity)
0
1
FCC Home 
 
 
FCC Home 
 
Center 
Center 
133 
 
Figure 23. Program Type and Concentrated Affluence 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Smart Start Quality Enhancement Funds and Residential Stability 
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Subsample Effective 2-Level Interactions with ERS Score as Outcome 
 
Figure 25. Program Type and Licensed Capacity 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Program Type and Concentrated Immigration 
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Figure 27. Extended Care and Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Head Start Funding and Concentrated Disadvantage 
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Figure 29. Head Start Funding and Concentrated Immigration 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Head Start Funding and Residential Stability 
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Figure 31. Head Start Funding and Concentrated Affluence 
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Subsample Effective 3-Level Interactions with ERS Score as Outcome 
 
Figure 32a. FCC Homes, Concentrated Immigration, and Smart Start Quality Enhancement 
Funds 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32b. Centers, Concentrated Immigration, and Smart Start Quality Enhancement Funds 
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Figure 33a. No Extended Care, Concentrated Disadvantage, Smart Start Quality Enhancement 
Funds 
 
 
Figure 33b. Extended Care, Concentrated Disadvantage, Smart Start Quality Enhancement 
Funds 
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Figure 34. Program Type and Licensed Capacity 
 
 
 
Figure 35. Head Start Funding and Concentrated Disadvantage 
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Figure 36. Head Start Funding and Concentrated Immigration 
 
 
 
Figure 37. Head Start Funding and Residential Stability 
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Figure 38. Head Start Funding and Concentrated Affluence 
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